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Functional Divisions and Other Corporate 
Separations Under Section 3 55 After 
Rafferty 
JOHN w. LEE 0 
Two OF the prerequisites for application of section 355, the 
exclusive vehicle for tax-free fragmentation of a single corpora-
tion, are meeting the active business tests and passing the 
anti-bail-out device test.1 For almost a decade the question whether 
section 355 permitted functional divisions of a functionally or 
vertically integrated business enterprise, i.e., a business in which 
a single entity controls all the functional stages in an industry 
from top to bottom, was unresolved.2 Although the regulations de-
fining an active business for purposes of section 355 seem to deny 
such status to components of a functionally integrated corpora-
tion,3 commentators thought such divisions were consonant with 
the purpose of the active business test.4 The issue is now answered. 
The First Circuit in Rafferty v. Commissioner G has recently held 
*JoHN W. LEE, (A.B., University of North Carolina 1965; LL.B., University of 
Virginia 1968; LL.'M. (Taxation), Georgetown University 1970) is n membl'r of the Bar 
of Virginia and associated with the firm of Hirschler and Fleischer, Riehmond, Virginia. 
1 I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(C) and 355(b); 355(a)(1)(B). A spin-off is similar to n 
dividend with each shareholder receiving a pro rata share of the stock of the spun·ofi' 
corporation while retaining his stock in the distributing corporation. A split-off is 
similar to a stock redemption with the distributee sbarebolders surrendering all or n 
portion of their stock in the distributing corporation for stock of the controlled 
corporation. The stock of the split-off corporation need not be distributed pro rata. A 
split-up is similar to a complete liquidation witb the parent corporation distributing 
stock of two or more subsidiaries to its stockholders as a plan of complete liquidation. 
See genertilly Jacobs, The .t!natomy of a Spin·Off, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3; Morris, 
Combining Divisive and .t!malgamating Jleorgani::ations: Section 355 Fails .t!oain, 40 
TEXAs L. REV. 315, 316 (1968). 
2 Lee, Section 482 and the Integrated Business Enterprise, 57 VA. L. REV. 137G (1971). 
3 Reg. §§ 1.355-1(c) and (d) Exs. 2, 5, 11 and 12. 
4 See, e.g., Whitman, Draining tlw S<Tbonian Bog: .d. N cw .t1pproacl1 1o Corporate 
Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1194, 1221-23 (1908); Ynsseo, 
Section 855: Disposal of Unwanted .t!ssets in Connection with a Reorganization, 22 
TAX L. REV. 439, 460-64 (1967); Jacobs, T11C .d.natomy of .d. Spin·Off, 1907 Duhe 
L.J. 1, 25-28. 
s 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971), c<Tt. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Juno 27, 1972). 
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that functional divisions of an existing business can actively con-
duct separate trades or businesses. 
In Rafferty a steel processing and distributing corporation had 
transferred its business premises to a newly formed subsidiary 
(Teragram) which then leased the premises back to its parent 
under a long-term lease. Teragram subsequently built a plant on 
raw land it had purchased and leased the plant to another related 
corporation. Shortly thereafter (which happened to be :five years 
and two months after the initial transfer of the steel business 
premises), the parent spun off the Teragram stock for the primary 
purpose of facilitating its dominant shareholder's estate plan-
exclusion of his many daughters from the management of the 
steel business and at the same time providing them with invest-
ment assets insulated from the fluctuations of the steel business. 
The Tax Court held, rejecting the Commissioner's arguments to 
the contrary, that the estate planning motive constituted a valid 
nontax reason for the separation and spin-off of Teragram.6 It 
further held, however, that Teragram was not engaged in the active 
conduct of a trade or business for the :five year period preceding 
distribution and that, regardless of the valid business purpose 
of the transaction, the parent's shareholders had extracted pas-
sive, investment type assets thereby bailing out earnings and 
profits of both corporations and, hence, the transaction con-
stituted a ''device.'' 
The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court but did so within a 
completely different conceptual framework. Whereas the lower 
court had found a business purpose for the spin-off but had 
denied tax-free treatment principally on the basis of the Commis-
sioner's active business regulations (with some indication that 
transactions with related parties only or renting property could 
not constitute the active conduct of a trade or business), the 
appellate court was disturbed by the "somewhat uncritical nature 
of the Tax Court's :finding of a business purpose'' and liberalized, 
indeed deemphasized, the active business test by restricting it 
to a showing of objective criteria manifesting that entrepreneurial 
activities quantitatively and qualitatively distinguished the cor-
porate operations from mere investments-a test which the tax-
payers did not pass. As a concomitant of this approach, the 
First Circuit made the device test a more formidable barrier to 
tax-free divisions. For under its formulation of the device test, 
if a distribution has considerable potential for use as a device for 
6 Joseph V. Rafferty, 55 T.C. 490 (1970). 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
1972] THE RAFFERTY CASE 455 
distributing earnings and profits (where for example the assets 
of one of the postdistribution corporations have a readily realiz-
able value and their sale does not impair the ta.~payer's equity 
interest in the other corporation), the distribution will not qualify 
for tax-free treatment under section 355 on the basis of share-
holder motives unless those motives are germane to the continu-
ance of the corporate business. The taxpayers also failed this test. 
This article examines the Rafferty resolutions of most of the 
controversies under the active business and device restrictions in 
the context of their earlier development and considers probable 
answers to remaining questions including the status of the existing 
active business and device regulations under the court's restate-
ment of these requirements. The active business concept is dealt 
with first because it had traditionally been thought to be the 
primary barrier to tax-free divisions, particularly functional 
divisions. 
Active Business Requirement 
BAcKGROUND-THE Rafferty CASE 
The active business prerequisites for nonrecognition of gain in 
a corporate separation under section 355 are (1) immediately 
after the distribution of stock in a controlled or spun-off corpora-
tion, the distributing and spun-off corporation must be ''engaged 
in the active conduct of a trade or business" and (2) such busi-
nesses must have been actively conducted during the five-year 
period ending on the date of distribution.7 The terms ''active 
conduct of a trade or business" and "trade or business" are, 
however, nowhere defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Conse-
quently, the definition in the regulations came to be of paramount 
importance: 
[F]or purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a specifie 
existing group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning 
income or profit from only such group of activities, and the activities 
included in such group must include every operation which forms a 
part of, or a step in, the process of earning income or profit from such 
group. Such group of activities ordinarily must include the collection 
of income and the payment of expenses. It does not include-
(1) The holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land or 
other property, including casual sales thereof (whether or not the 
proceeds of such sales are reinvested), 
(2) The ownership and operation of land or buildings all or sub-
7 I.R.C. § 355(b)(l). 
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stantially all of which are used and occupied by the owner in the opera-
tion of a trade or business, or 
(3) A group of activities which, while a part of a business operated 
for profit, are not themselves independently producing income even 
though such activities would produce income with the addition of other 
activities or with large increases in activities previously incidental· or 
insubstantial. s 
This definition is illustrated by examples, a number of which indi-
cate that the components of an integrated business previously con-
ducted by a single corporation do not constitute an active business 
or are not contin-uing the active conduct of the trade or business 
formerly conducted by the predivision single corporation.0 
The authority of these regulations was questioned by commenta-
tors on the grounds that they appeared to rest at least in part 
upon another p:r:ovision of the regulations 10 that prohibited appli-
cation of section 355 to the division of a single business, but which 
had been rejected in the landmark case of Edmund P. Coady.11 
Furthermore, the other th'eories which might be formulated from 
results stated in these regulations to support the conclusion that 
functional divisions of vertically integrated corporations cannot 
actively conduct separate trades or businesses were not thought. t.o 
be mandated by the purpose, as announced by Coady, of the active 
business requirement: "to prevent the tax free separation of 
active and inactive assets into active and inactive corporate en-
tities." 12 Accordingly, commentators uniformly concluded that 
section 355 did apply to divisions of a vertically integrated cor-
poration. The Tax Court, however, in several post-Coady deci-
sions 13 approved the main definitional portion of the regulations 
and in several cases that appeared to involve functional divisions 
"carefully avoided the implications of the Coady rationale by 
finding that the separated activities constituted an independent 
sReg. § 1.355-1(e). 
s Reg. § 1.355-1(d) Exs. 2, 5, 11 and 12. 
10 Reg. § 1.355-1(a). 
1135 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'a per curiam, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961), nonacq., Rov. 
Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 C.B. 61, nonacq. revoked, Rev. Rut. 64-147, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 
136. See Cohen, Current Partial Liquidation ana Spin-Of! Problems, 41 T~Es 775, 779-
780 (1963). 
12 Edmund P. Coady, 35 T.C. 771, 777 (1960). See E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 0771 
696 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972). 
1a E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 696 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Andrew M. Spheeris, 54 T.C. 1353, 1362 (1970), af!'d, 461 F.2!l 271 (7th Cir. 
1972); Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021, 1028 (1964). 
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five-year-old business or came within the 'geographical' concept 
of the Ooady case." 14 
The First Circuit in Rafferty has now confirmed the view that 
the correctness of section 1.355-1 (c) and the examples contained 
in section 1.355-1(d) of the regulations is questionable in light 
of the Ooady rejection of the separate business restriction. The 
court pointed out that a broad reading of the phrase in the regula-
tions that excludes from the active business definition activities 
which were not themselves independently producing income was 
largely a restatement of the erroneous separate business require-
ment and believed the Ooady rationale also applicable to functional 
divisions of existing businesses.111 
Had the appellate court said no more, ambiguity might have 
arisen as to whether its objections extended beyond the indepen-
dent production of income aspects of the regulations. However, 
the Rafferty court further stated that the provisions were so 
broadly drawn as to be inconsistent with congressional purpose 
in some instances . .An illustration was that "the regulations could 
be construed to deny [section] 355 treatment to a large hotel chain 
which spun-off its land purchasing, hotel construction, and leasing 
activities from its hotel management operations if the spun-off 
corporation leased the completed hotels exclusively to the man-
agement corporation. We are reluctant to approve such regulations 
which appear to fly in the face of Congressional intent.'' 1° Cases 
such as Bon-sall v. Oo-mmissioner,11 Theodore F. Appleby,18 and 
Isabel A. Elliot 19 had held that operation of owner-occupied real 
estate primarily used in the principal business of the distributing 
corporation during the five year predisposition period did not 
qualify as an active business and that the activities connected 
with rental income from outsiders were too incidental to constitute 
14 BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CO!U'Oil.ATIONS All'D SIIMlE· 
HOLDERS ~ 13.04, at 14 (3d ed. 1971). Under the geoprapbie rule (contained in Ecction 
1.355-1(d) examples 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, and perhaps 10, of the regulations) if the businezs 
operations in one geographic area are virtunlly complete in tllemselves, similar opera· 
tions in a different geographic locale constitute n. separate business. Thla test has been 
rejected by Lockwood's Estate v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712, 71G (8th Cir. 1905). 
A similar test is applicable in determining business purpose under sections 2G9 and 
1551. See also Reg. §§ 1.382(a)-1(h) (5) and (6) (substantially same trade or business 
and changes in location); Dubin, Unscrambling an Acquisition, 49 TAXES 849, s:m 
(1971). 
15452 F.2d at 772 n.10; accord, King v. Comm'r, 458 F.2d 245 (Gth Cir. 1972). 
16 452 F.2d at 772 n.12. 
11 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963}. 
1s 35 T.C. 755, 764 (1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 
910 (1962). 
19 32 T.C. 283 (1959). 
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an active business; therefore, the spun-off real estate rental busi-
ness was lacking the requisite five year history. Furthermore, 
separately incorporating and aging for five years the rental activi-
ties would not in substance differ from the operation of owner 
occupied real estate.20 Under this rationale, as long as a spun-off 
corporation's leasing activities were limited to related parties, it 
could not satisfy the postdistribution active business requirement 
either. Thus, the First Circuit, in giving its imprimatur to a func-
tional separation of previously owner-occupied real estate which 
is thereafter leased back to the distributing corporation, has not 
only overruled the proviso of the regulations that owner-occupied 
real estate does not constitute an active trade or business but has 
also cast considerable doubt upon the reasoning of Bonsall, 
Appleby and Elliot. 
Equally significant is the assumption inherent in the example 
contained in the Rafferty opinion that a spun-off corporation deal-
ing only with related entities can nevertheless be engaged in the 
active conduct of a separate trade or business.21 This dictum in 
Rafferty has since become the Sixth Circuit's implicit conclusion 
in King v. Gommissioner/2 a recent section 355 decision strongly 
molded by Rafferty. Of prime importance to the Tax Court's 
conclusion below that the rental real estate activities of the spun-
off corporations did not qualify as active businesses was that they 
all rented to a related tenant only. The review court in King re-
versed the Tax Court on the active business issue without even 
commenting on this fact, except to express considerable reserva-
tion as to the validity of the "imprecise" active business regula-
tions and their independent production of income requirement.113 
Having disposed of the active business regulations, the appellate 
court in Rafferty set forth its own formulation of the active busi-
ness requirement: ''a corporation must engage in entrepreneurial 
20 E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 700 n.9 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Rea! Estate Busi· 
ness, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 328 (1972). 
21 Elliot, Appleby and Bonsall have been approvingly read to deny activo business 
status "unless a substantial portion of the gross income attributable to [ r<'ntnl] 
property is derived from other than related corporations." Mnssco, Section 365: Dis· 
posaZ of Unwanted Assets in Connection with a Reorganization, 22 TAX L. REV. 439, 
457-59 (1967). In an interesting reversal of traditional positions tho taxpayer, in 
Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971), conceded that real estate 
leased after the division to a related corporation did not constitute an "activo" 
business; in Elliot the government conceded that it did. 
22 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972), reversing 55 T.C. 677 (1971). 
2a 458 F.2d at 249. 
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endeavors of such a nature and to such an extent as to qualita-
tively distinguish its operations from mere investments. :More-
over, there should be objective indicia of such corporate opera-
tions." 24 The spun-off corporation (Teragram) in Rafferty failed 
the first part of this test. During the first four years of the 
five year predisposition period Teragram had leased back to its 
parent its only asset, the business premises used by the parent, 
for a fixed return, i.e., under a net lease, "an activity, in economic 
terms, almost indistinguishable from an investment in securi-
ties." 25 The spun-off corporation also failed the "objective in-
dicia" component of the court's bipartite active business test. 
During this same period it paid neither salaries nor rent, did not 
employ independent contractors and its only activities were col-
lecting rent, paying taxes and keeping separate books. The court 
did not reach the more difficult question in its view: whether 
Teragram 's activities during the fifth year of the five year pre-
disposition period when it purchased unimproved real estate and 
financed and built a plant, and incurred substantial repair ex-
penses, constituted an active trade or business. 
EFFECT oF Rafferty ON RECENT AcTIVE 
BusiNESS CASES 
Activities Performed by Independent Contractor 
The Tax Court in Rafferty had stated that although the fact 
that Teragram had financed the construction through a mortgage 
on which it alone was liable was an indication of some independent 
activity by Teragram, it was by no means conclusivc.20 This 
24 452 F.2d at 772. 
2s 452 F.2d at 772. The appellate opinion never c.~licitly categorizes the lcnso in 
question as a net lease; however, its terms as set forth in the opinion below (le,;see to 
pay fixed monthly rent and all taxes and to maintain nnd repair premises) manifest that 
it was a net lease, i.e., all or virtually all c."penses, such as maintenance, repairs and 
taxes were paid by the lessee. Insur:mce and some taxes (for which the subsidiary '~as 
apparently reimbursed) were paid by the lessor. Joseph V. Rafferty, lili T.C. 490, 491-9!!, 
499 (1970). See E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 697-98, (1971), rcv'd, 458 F.!:!d 245 (Utb 
Cir. 1972). While ownership of property leased under a net lease may in economic 
terms be almost indistinguishable from an investment in securitie2, n legal distinction 
has developed in ascertaining whether ownership and operation of rental real estate con· 
stitutes a trade or business. Where securities are owned, the stockholder cannot claim 
the income generating activities as his own in determining his trade or businc,;s status, 
whereas the activities of operating rental real estate nrc imputed to the. owner. See 
Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Coniluct" of a Rental Ileal Estate 
Business, 25 TAX LAWYER 3171 323 (1972). 
26 .Toseph V. Rafferty, 55 T.C. 490, 499 (1970). 
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could have meant the court felt the activities did not constitute 
the active conduct of a trade or business or, as is more likely in 
view of its subsequent decision in E. Ward King,21 they were not 
in substance its own activities. In King the taxpayer maintained 
that the acquisition, financing and construction of terminals, 
leased by the subsequently spun-off subsidiaries on a net lease 
basis to their parent, constituted the active conduct of a trade or 
business. The Tax Court held that the subsidiaries performed 
the activities in name only-they were performed by employees 
of the parent. The court implicitly disregarded the separate ex-
istence of the subsidiaries.28 In doing so the Tax Court overlooked 
a closely analogous and contrary trend in the case law development 
under the active business provisions of section 921(2). A recur-
ring issue in these cases is whether sales made by an export. 
subsidiary of a United States manufacturing corporation con-
stitute the active conduct of a trade or business where the flub-
sidiary has no staff of its own, but instead relies upon the parent 
to supply salesmen and other staff. The courts have uniformly 
held that the lack of a complete employee organization does not 
in and of itself preclude qualification. Thus, for example, th<' 
active trade or business requirement has been held satisfied where 
the subsidiary paid a management fee for services rendered and 
the subsidiary had at least one employee who kept its books and 
reviewed all of its paper work.29 
The Rafferty appellate opinion speaks indirectly to this arc>a. 
In its discussion of the ''objective indicia'' portion of the bipartite 
active business test it adopted, the court noted that the spun-off 
corporation had not employed independent contractors. The court 
thereby implicitly answered the question whether the active con-
duct of a trade or business for purposes of section 355 is pres<'nt 
where the major entrepreneurial activities, such as leasing, repair-
27 55 T.C. 677 (1971). 
2s 55 T.C. at 699-700 (''On brief the petitioners urge us not to illsreg:ml tiH• snnrt!ty 
of the corporate entity, but, on facts such as tltosl' prcsenteil hl'n•, tho ilopondl'nco 
of the sulJsidiary corporations serves to underline the pl'titiont>rs' fniluro to show tho 
active conduct of a business"); Nott>, Section 355 '.~ .Actit•e Business Rule-.An Ollt· 
dated Inefficacy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 955, 985 (1971). The Sixth Circuit so ~OtH'Illd(•d on 
appeal and reversed the Tax Court on this point, 458 F.2d at 248. 
20 See, e.g., Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2il 525 (9th Cir. 1!162); 
A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. CJ. 1960), Tho sub· 
sidiaries in King had a single employee in the first three years of tho fivo yonr pro· 
distribution period and later paid tiJCir common parent a managl'ml'nt feo for such 
services. However, the acquisition, financing and construetion activities Wl'ro por· 
formed by employees of the parent who were also officers of the subshlinrios but wero 
not compensated by them for their services. 
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ing and maintenance, are conducted by an independent contractor 
rather than by an employee of the corporation owning the prop-
erty. While under some other active business provisions, the 
operation of a rental real estate business does not constitute an 
active business if the rental activities are performed by an inde-
pendent contractor,30 it was thought that supervision of such 
independent contractors might constitute the active conduct of 
a trade or business under section 355.31 Moreover, some judicial 
development under section 355 suggested that a business could 
be actively conducted by a third party,32 and it was well established 
under the usual trade or business provisions that management and 
rental activities of an agent or independent contractor on behalf of 
an owner were imputed to the owner in determining his trade or 
business status.33 
Although use of an independent contractor might appear to 
place a corporation more in the position of a passive investor, it 
certainly does not make the corporate assets used in the business 
any less active and, as discussed below, corporate assets should be 
the primary focus of the active business test, for that is where 
the bail-out potential lies.34 Thus the Rafferty court's implicit 
resolution of this issue was in agreement with its general adoption 
of a transactional approach under which the active business and 
device tests are applied in accordance with their underlying pur-
pose-prevention of a bail-out-and its opposition to the tendency 
of these tests to develop independent significance apart from 
this purpose.35 :Moreover, Hanson v. United Staies,::.o a recent 
district court section 355 decision, held that the fact that a business 
had no telephone or separate business address, conducted no ad-
vertising or even held itself out to third persons as a separate 
business address or entity, though relevant, was not dispositive 
of the active business test. The court approvingly quoted a non-
3o See Reg. §§ 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii)(b)(3)(i) and 1.954-~(d)(l)(ii) Ex. (4). 
31 COHEN, CoRPO&ATE SEPA&ATIONS-ACTIVE BllSINESS REQUIRE!!E!:TS A-ll (B.N.A. 
224 T.M. 1969). 
32 W.E. Gabriel Fabrication C~., 42 T.C. 545, 556 (1964). 
33 See, e.g., Reiner v. United States, 222 F.::!d 770 (7th Cir. 19::i::i); Gilford v. 
Comm 'r, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953}; cf. Voss v. United States, 3!'!!1 F.!'!d 1M (7th 
Cir. 1964); see generally Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguislu:d From "Conduct" of 
a Eental Eeal Estate Business, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 321-2~ (1972). 
34 Rafferty speaks of sale of both stock and nssets, but it is clear that the sto~l: bad 
a readily realizable value because the assets were highly liquid. 
35 See text accompanying notes 96-105 infra for an explanation of the court's general 
approach. 
3s 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971). 
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section 355 case which had concluded that a business without 
employees may be conducted through agents.87 
Consequently, the Tax Court's conclusion in King that the 
subsidiaries performed these activities in name only is question-
able.88 Indeed the Sixth Circuit in its reversal of the Tax Court 
in King disagreed with the Tax Court's conclusion that the 
subsidiaries performed the acquisition of property, financing, con-
struction and expansion of the terminals in name only. The 
appellate court believed this conclusion was based on the inter-
dependence between the parent and subsidiaries and that the Tax 
Court had disregarded the separate entities of the real estate 
holding subsidiaries. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court's 
conclusion here was "violative of the principle that, especially 
for tax purposes, separate corporations, even parent and wholly 
owned subsidiary, must be treated as separate entities, no matter 
how closely they may be affiliated. The separate corporate entity 
may not be disregarded.'' 39 
The "Entrepreneurial Activities" Test 
Since these management activities were conducted by the sub-
sidiaries in King, the question arises whether they constitute the 
active conduct of a trade or business. This requires analysis of 
the Rafferty "entrepreneurial activities" test-'' entrepreneurial 
activities of .such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively 
distinguish its operations from mere investments." Both King 
and Rafferty involved rental of real estate and the usual, i.e., not 
"active," trade or business test applied to such activities is regu-
lar and continuous management or rental activities. Such activi-
87 American Savings Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1971) (section 61 "sham" issue). Other 
seetion 355 deeisions have held that cases deeided under Code provisions not containing 
the qualification "active" are not authority upon tho question of whnt constitutl•s an 
active business. E.g., E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 700 (1971). Hanson appears on this 
point more in agreement with Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 
1962), deeided under the 1939 Code predecessor to section 355, which hoM that tho 
traditional trade or business cases are authority as to what constitutes an activo 
business. Of. George Rothenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1). 
ss Even if the subsidiaries were totally "inert" so that these activities wore attribut· 
able to the parent, it could be argued that the parent was the true owner of the entire 
real estate aspects of the enterprise during the five year period. Thus, it would have 
actively conducted the acquisition, financing and leasing real estate business which it 
transferred to the subsidiaries as they were spun off. But of. H.L. Morgenstern, 50 
T.C. 44, 47 (1971). The only question (which is not answered by the record) would bo 
whether the spun-off corporations were actively condueting a real cstato business nfter 
the distribution. 
s9 458 F.2d 247. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y. D. Tax Law Review 
1972] THE RAFFERTY CASE 463 
ties generally involve more than investment and reinvestment 
in real estate, they constitute the management of real estate itself 
for profit. A distinction has been drawn by the Tax Court under 
another active business provision between the active conduct of 
rental business and the mere holding of property for investment 
based, in effect, upon regular and continuous management and 
rental activities.40 Similarly for the purposes of an exception to 
the term "foreign personal holding company income" as used in 
the subpart F provisions, rents are considered under section 
1.95~2(d) (1) (ii) (a) (2) of the regulations to be derived in the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business if generated by leasing '' [r] eal 
property with respect to which the lessor performs active and 
substantial management and operational functions while the prop-
erty is leased." This test is met where the owner of an office 
building acts as rental agent for the leasing of the offices and 
employs a substantial staff to perform other management and main-
tenance functions.41 
Thus Rafferty's new test approaches the usual trade or busi-
ness test applied to rental real estate by tribunals other than the 
Tax Court (which applies a more liberal test), and which has been 
relied upon in other active business provisions.42 Rafferty may 
therefore signal a trend towards uniformity in the context of 
the section 355 active business concept not only as to other active 
business provisions but also as to the usual trade or business 
provisions-a goal advocated by some commentators. Significantly, 
although the net leases involved in Rafferty or King would not 
meet this test, the acquisition, financing and construction activities 
present in King (and in Rafferty in the fifth year) would.43 The 
40 For a discussion maintaining that the management activities test ns applied to 
rental real estate distinguishes such activities from mere investments sec Lee, ".A.ctit:e 
Conduct" Distinguished From "Conduct" of a Bental Ileal Estate Business, ::!5 T.u: 
LA.WYE& 317, 323-24 (1972). 
uReg. § 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii)(c) Ex. 5. However, these regulations state that examples 
such as the one in text constitute ''specific cases in which rents • • • will be considered 
for purposes of this subparagraph to be derived in the active conduct of a trnde or 
business." Reg. § 1.954-2(d)(l)(i) (emphasis added). The import may be that these 
definitional rules are considered by the Treasury to be of less than universal applicn· 
tion to the term ''active conduct of a trade or business.'' If so, the question arises 
as to the source of the authority to give the same phrase chnmeleon-U!.to quality in 
different Code provisions. Moreover, the regulations disregard the activities of an 
independent contractor, such as a real estate management firm (hence the example in 
text notes that the owner acted as rental agent). Reg. § L954-2(d) (3) (i). 
42 George Rothenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Union Natioll!ll Bank v. United 
States, 195 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.N.Y. 1961). 
43 It should be noted that another basis for the decision reached in King that none 
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Sixth Circuit's opinion in King is not entirely clear on this point. 
Its primary emphasis was on the construction activities of the 
terminal leasing subsidiaries but it also reiterated that they per-
formed ''all activities necessary to the operation of the real 
estate leasing business." Its response to the Tax Court's conclu-
sion that income from net leases constituted pure passive income 
without the concomitant expenditure of money or effort on the part 
of the lessor was equally equivocal: (1) net leases represented 
the most advantageous method of doing business, were bona fide 
and of a customary type in the industry for a customary rent, and 
(2) leasing was far from the only activity conducted by the 
subsidiaries. The first response-apparently a modified business 
purpose approach-is not responsive to whether net leasing activi-
ties without more constitute the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness; the second implies that the construction activities alone 
or in conjunction with net leasing qualify as an active business. 
Rafferty also requires objective indicia of the entrepreneurial 
activities and held that the failure of the spun-off corporation to 
pay salaries hardly constituted an indicium of corporate opera-
tions. In King, the Tax Court had noted that the spun-off corpora-
tions had only one employee for the first three years of the five 
year predistribution period and thereafter none, concluding that 
''objectively we find it quite difficult to perceive the active conduct 
of a trade or business when no activities are being performed by 
the corporations in question.'' The Sixth Circuit's answer to this 
conclusion by the Tax Court was that each subsidiary had four 
officers and at least four directors, who all rendered substantial 
services in acting for them and that officers and directors cus-
tomarily serve without compensation in the absence of special 
provisions. 
Since operating an apartment building would constitute an 
active business under the entrepreneurial activities approach, any 
implication that the section 355 active business test as applied to 
rental real estate requires in addition to regular and continuous 
management and rental services (furnishing of utilities, clearing 
of public areas, collection of trash, et cetera) "significant" addi-
tional services, such as mail services, to be rendered to tenants,44 
that might have arisen from the comparison by the lower court in 
of the real estate leasing corporations received rentals from outside parties, 55 T.O. 081 
was expressly rejected in Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 772 nn.10 and 12. 
44 E.g., Saunders, ''Trade or Business,'' Its Meaning uniler t11e Internal Bevonuo 
Coile, 1960 S. Calif. Inst. 693, 744. 
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Rafferty of the section 355 active business concept with the sec-
tion 1372(e) (5) definition of "passive investment income," should 
be dispelled. 
Although the Treasury has frequently utilized the technique of 
excluding "active business" type receipts from the definition of 
"rents" only if the recipient renders "significant services," this 
approach has not been universally applied. For example, sec-
tions 163(d)(3)(B) and 57(b)(2)(B) (the excess investment in-
terest provisions) include rents in the term "investment income" 
but only to the extent such income is not derived from the conduct 
of a trade or business. The proposed regulations accompanying 
section 57 appear to equate this exception with the active conduct 
of a trade or business, but rely on the definition provided in the 
regulations of "property held for investment"-a key term un-
defined in the statute-for substantive content.45 That term in 
turn is patterned after the statutory definition of investment 
income : Property held for production or collection of passive in-
come, such as rent, unless such income is "derived from proper-
ties actively used in the conduct of a trade or business.'' 40 An 
earlier version of this exception followed the more traditional 
terminology of income derived from the active conduct of trade 
or business.47 
This "actively used" exception clearly would not require the 
lessor to render significant additional services to the tenant since 
the proposed investment interest regulations further provide that 
property is not held for investment if expenses in connection with 
it are deductible under section 162,48 one of the provisions under 
which the real estate rental business test of regular and con-
tinuous management and rental activities developed and which 
does not demand rendition of such significant additional services. 
Similarly, judicial interpretation of the phrase ''actively carrying 
on a trade or business" used in section 1.761-1(a) (1) of the regula-
tions has rested on case law development under section 162.''0 And 
just as the subpart F regulations offer rental of offices in an office 
building as an example of an active business, section 1.761-l(a) (1) 
illustrates actively carrying on a trade or business with the ex-
ample of co-owners of an apartment building leasing space and 
45 Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(4), 36 Fed. Reg. 12024 (1971); of. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)· 
(vi). 
46 Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b) (2) (i), 36 Fed. Reg. 12023 (1971). 
47 Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(2), 35 Fed. Reg. 19767 (1970). 
4BProp. Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(2)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 12023 (1971). 
49 George R{)thenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967). 
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providing services to the occupants directly or through an agent.50 
On the other hand, payments for use or occupancy of apartments 
or offices are generally treated as passive ''rents'' under the sub-
chapter S regulations.51 
In summary, the adoption with respect to other provisions deal-
ing with active business or passive income of management and 
rental activities as an alternative to the restrictive significant 
additional services approach of the subchapter S regulations 
militates against reliance on the latter provision to determine 
whether the section 355 active business test is met in the context 
of a rental real estate business. 
Current Production of Income 
The Rafferty court's promulgation of the entrepreneurial activi-
ties test and rejection of the requirement of independent pro-
duction of income do not directly answer the question of whether a 
prerequisite of actively conducting a business is current produc-
tion of income. Andrew M. 8pheeris,52 decided by the Tax Court 
shortly before it handed down Rafferty and King, puts this issue 
in perspective. There a corporation was actively conducting a busi-
ness of operating and leasing several commercial rental proper-
ties when fire gutted an office building located on one of the 
properties. Due to conflict among its shareholders as to whether 
to reconstruct the existing building or to undertake new improve-
ments on a larger scale under a proposed city redevelopment 
project, the vacant building and its lot were placed in a new 
corporation (Anmarcon) which was then split off with two share-
holders in the parent exchanging all their stock in the old corpora-
tion for all of the stock in the new corporation. Anmarcon 's share-
holders continued extensive activities and negotiations towards 
erecting an appropriate structure on the land and returning it to 
income producing status. Approximately a year later, the city 
abandoned the redevelopment project and after further negotia-
tions to :finance large scale improvements, Anmarcon transferred 
the property in a like-kind exchange. 
The Service agreed that the division met all the requirements of 
section 355, with one exception-the postdistribution active busi-
ness requirement. The Tax Court found that due to the nativities 
to restore the property to income producing status the property 
50 Reg. § 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii) (c) Ex. 5. 
51 Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (vi). 
52 54 T.C. 1353 (1970), aff'd, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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was not held by Anmarcon for investment purposes. Therefore, 
the split-off did not result in the separation of the old corpora-
tion's business and investment assets. But the court further 
announced that "Section 355 (b) requires not only that the assets 
involved in a corporate separation be business assets, but that 
the assets so separated, together with the activities in connection 
therewith, constitute operating businesses immediately after such 
separation.'' 53 It found that the activities in themselves would 
not result in income or profit since the improvement projects 
would have required the acquisition of additional land and were 
contingent upon the city's plans for redevelopment. 
Thus, the Tax Court in Spheer-i.s decided that active business 
status was precluded by the proviso of the regulations that "a 
trade or business consists of a specific group of activities being 
carried on for the purpose of earning income or profit.'' M To the 
extent the opinion rests on the independent production of income 
doctrine-the activities would not in themselves result in income or 
profit-it obviously conflicts with the Rafferty rejection of that doc-
trine. The Seventh Circuit has recently affirmed Spheeris, agreeing 
with the Tax Court "that holding a fire-damaged, non-income-
producing property did not constitute the active conduct of a trade 
or business.'' 55 In stark contrast with this conclusion is section 
1.382(a)-l(h) (6) of the regulations and its accompanying Exam-
ple 2 which reveal that the Treasury has on occasion committed it-
self to the position that a temporary suspension of a corporation's 
normal activities (such as manufacturing) due to a fire does not 
of itself constitute a failure to carry on an active trade or business. 
Although the corporation in the example engaged in substantial 
efforts to reactivate its business by reconstructing the damaged 
plant, there is no indication that it was producing income. 
The Tax Court's limitation of active business status to operat-
ing businesses was based on legislative history accompanying the 
1954 House proposals, which the court erroneously assumed were 
substantially similar to the Senate active business provision.~;o 
In fact, the underlying theory of the House corporate division 
ss 54 T.C. at 1362. 
54 Reg. § 1.355-1(e). 
55 Spheeris v. Comm 'r, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972). 
ss Andrew M. Spheeris, 54 T.C. 1353, 1362 n. 4 (1970). te Subsection (c) of section 
353 defines the term 'inactive corporation' •••• [T]he transfer to newly created 
subsidiary of a portion of its [the distributing corporation] business and tbe distribu· 
tion of such stock . • • to the shareholders will not qualify • • • unless such assets 
constitute an operating business." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., ::!d Sess. Al23-::!4 
(1954). (Emphasis added). 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
468 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27: 
section was completely rejected by the Senate: ''Under the House 
bill, it is immaterial whether the assets are those used in an 
active business . . . . Your committee returns to existing law in 
not permiting the tax free separation of an existing corporation 
into active and inactive entities." 57 
It is somewhat surprising that the Tax Court held that though 
the assets were active,t;s the corporation, in effect, was not: It 
seems unlikely that the Coady rationale contemplated the applica-
tion of different criteria to determine whether assets or the cor-
porate entity were active or inactive. Furthermore, since Anmar· 
con's development activities manifested that it did not hold the 
property for investment purposes, those same activities meet the 
Rafferty active business test-distinguishing the corporate opera-
tions from mere investments.59 Moreover, an operating business is 
not a reliable test: The spun-off corporation in Rafferty although 
an operating business was ''in economic terms, almost indistin-
guishable from an investment in securities.'' 
The Tax Court, however, also observed that the activities of 
Anmarcon ''were, at most, no more than preliminary to actually 
51 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 5D-51 (1954); see also W.E. Gabriel 
Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545, 555 (1964). The House bill was intended to chango tho 
existing law and make it immaterial whether assets were used in an activo business or 
were investment assets. Under the House Bill if stock of an ''inactive corporation,'' one 
with more than 10 per cent of personal holding company income, was disposed of 
within ten years of a corporate division, the proceeds would be tn.xed as ordinary 
income. A "good" corporation had 90 per cent of its income generated by "assets 
constituting an operating business" or by "operating assets." Spheeris was not tho 
first court to misread the legislative history in this area. See Pnrshelsky 's Estate v. 
Co='r, 303 F.2d 14, 17-18, n.14 (2d Cir. 1962). 
58 "In the instant case, after the building situated en the Wells Stroot property was 
destroyed by fire [the taxpayer] engaged in numerous activities, first on behalf 
of the company and then on behalf of Anmarcon, which were directed toward ulti· 
mately returning the property to an income-producing status. We do not, therefore 
think that the Wells Street property was abandoned as a business asset by tho company 
prior to [the time when] such property was transferred to Anmarcon, nor do wo 
think the record supports the view that the property was thereafter held by Anmarcon 
for investment purposes. It seems clear, therefore, that the transfer of the Wells 
Street property to Anmarcon and tho distribution of Anmarcon 's stock to [tho 
taxpayer] did not result in the separation of a corporation's business and investment 
assets." 54 T.C. at 1361. 
59 Active development and management and maintenance of rental properties removes 
a corporation from "mere holding or investment company status" under section 533 
where "mere" distinguishes between holding or investment corporations that arc 
strictly passive in nature and those that engage in some measure of business activity, 
Dahlem Foundation, Inc., 54 T.C. 1566, 1576-78 (1970). The implication is, however, 
that such activities (which were more extensive than the development activities in 
Spheeris) would not remove a corporation from classification ns an investment company. 
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engaging in a business.'' 60 Under the ''preopening'' expense 
cases, the rule is seemingly well established that to the extent n 
business has not begun to function as a going concern and to 
perform those activities for which it was organized it is not en-
gaged in carrying on any trade or business within the meaning 
of section 162(a).61 The Seventh Circuit in sustaining the Com-
missioner's and the Tax Court's position in Spheer-is relied in 
major part on this approach-in its view Anmarcon through its 
sole stockholder was engaging in a search for ventures which 
would be new and more profitable than the old rental business 
which, the court concluded, had been discontinued. These activities 
were categorized as investigative and promotional in nature.02 
Just as any nonproduction of income basis for the Sp1zeeris 
conclusion is weak, the rationale that the split-off corporation was 
not actively conducting a business because it was merely investi-
gating a new business is subject to criticism. The pre-operat-
ing or investigatory expense rule does not apply where the investi-
gated opportunity is related to a previously existing business, i.e., 
investigatory expenses are not per se capital, rather they must be 
related to an existing business. 03 Thus, the Fourth Circuit, in York 
ao 54 T.C. at 1363. 
61See Richmond Television C-orp. v. United Stnte3, 345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Clr.), 
'IJacatea ana remandea per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. OS (1905). The lD.rgest 
body of authority on "preparatory expenses" is to be found in the area of farming 
expenses, see, e.g., Maple v. Co='r, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971); Wonell v. 
United States, 254 F. Supp. 9921 996 (S.D. Tex. 1906) ; Edwin H. Miner, 21 T.C.'M. 
1173, 1176 (1967). Despite the Service's heavy reliance on Bic7mJond Tclt:t:ision in that 
area there is some question as to whether co=encement of commercinl enterprises 
and of farming operations are true analogues. 
The rationale of the preopening expense concopt is subject to strong criticism. The 
argument that capitalization is required because sueh expenditures increase tht:> t:>arning 
capacity of a bnsiness, Mid-Stnte Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 690, 714 (1954), is contradicted 
by the fact that similar expenditures to expand an existing businc83 aro currently 
deductible. See York v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). The other rationnlt:>, 
espoused in JUchmond Television, that a preopening enterprise is not engnging in 
a trade or bnsiness conflicts with the Service's position in other areas, e.g., Reg. § 1.::!48-
1(a) (1), Rev. Rul 72-220, 1972-18 I.R.B. 16, and earlier case law, e.g., 379 ~fadi.!lon 
Ave., Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932). 
62 "Investigative" eonnotes a preoperating expense, see Mort~n Franlt, ::!0 T.C. 511, 
513 (1933); "promotional" on the other hand connotes the Higgins-W71ipplo non-
business expense or investment aetivities development. Inve3tigntion by itself is not, 
in the eyes of the Service, a section 355 trade or business. Sec Rev. Rul. 57-412, 
1957-2 C.B. 247; Fleischer, The To:.c Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Int:estigat{on 
For a Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REV. 507, 508 n.10 (1959). However, 
the Higgins trend is properly limited to the distinction between activities of n 
shareholder and his corporation. Promotional activities by n. corporation would Ecem 
the essence of the entrepreneurial process, the npproaeh taken in Baflt:rty. 
63 It is possible that the expense need only be related to a. future business, rotht:'r 
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v. Commissioner,64 reversed the Tax Court's position that expendi-
tures by a residential and commercial real estate developer to 
determine the potential of a tract of land for industrial develop-
ment were nondeductible exploratory expenditures to determine 
whether to venture into a new line of business on the grounds that 
the activity was still intramural, not a new pursuit, apart from his 
general occupation. Similarly, the recent employment agency fee 
cases in the Tax Court indicate that investigative activities are 
deductible if made in the same general type of business in which 
the taxpayer has been engaging.6li 
Since section 355 (b) contemplates the possibility of continuance 
of the same predisposition business across corporate lines, a newly 
created spun-off corporation should retain the status of the predis-
position business conducted by the distributing corporation in the 
same manner as if it had conducted the business for the purpose 
of determining whether the new corporation is merely preparing 
to engage in a new business or is attempting to expand from an 
existing predisposition business into a related and, hence, not new 
pursuit. Following this approach it would not matter that the 
prior real estate activities were ''discontinued' 1 since trade or 
business status does not cease to exist during a reasonable period 
of transition. An illustration is the taxpayer in Harold Haft 66 
than an existing business. See Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 935 (1969); c1ccord, 
David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380-81 (1970) (alternative holding). 
64 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). 
6G David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 378, 381-82 (1970) (nlternative holding and con· 
curring opinion); cf., Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. No. 20 (1972). The Seventh Clr· 
cuit did not directly answer the taxpayer's argument that the corporation continued to 
engage in the same type of business. 
66 40 T.C. 1, 6 (1963); cf. Penton v. United States, 259 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 
1958) (continuity of business not destroyed by temporary cessation of business activi· 
ties; no discontinuance of operation of business regularly carried on); United States 
v. Hercules Mining Co., 119 F.2d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 19U), cert. clenied, 314 U.S. 
658 (1941) (despite temporary cessation of milling business corporation doing business 
for capital stock ta."i: under section 701(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934). 
Similarly, the regulations under section 382(a), apparently reflecting the Penton 
pre-1954 net operating loss deduction trend, provide that a corporation has not 
continued to carry on a trade or business substantially the same as that conducted 
prior to a change of ownership if it is "not carrying on an active trade or business 
at the time" of such change. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (6); accord, S.F.H., Inc., 53 T.O. 
28, 33 (1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1971). As an illustration, they further 
conclude that a temporary suspension of a. corporation's normal activities due to 
involuntary abnormal circumstances, such as a fire, does not of itself constitute a 
failure to carry on substantially the same (active) trade or business. Reg. § 1.382(a)-
1 (h)(6) Ex. 2; accord, Glover Packing Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 3<!21 348 (ct. 
Cl. 1964). The corporation in the above example suspended ito manufacturing activi· 
ties due to a fire and thereafter made substantial efforts to reactivate its business 
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who did not cease to be in the costume jewelry business simply 
because he was temporarily unemployed and had no merchandise 
to sell. There the taxpayer was actively seeking a suitable connec-
tion commensurate with his status in the costume jewelry field, 
and the court found the transition period (over four years) a 
reasonable one. In Sphee1·is the nexus between Anmarcon 's real 
estate development activities, implicitly active in the eyes of the 
Tax Court, and the predisposition rental real estate business was 
such that they were incurred in a trade or business and not pre-
liminary to actually engaging in a business. 
Even if Anmarcon 's development activities related only to a 
new business, under the organizational expenditures provision 
a corporation is deemed to have begun business (the starting point 
for a 60 month amortization period) when its activities have 
advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of the 
business.67 Certainly Anmarcon's acquisition of property suitable 
only for rental, in one form or another, established that it was in 
the rental real estate business. Third, the pre-operating expense 
trend has on occasion been utilized in applying a ''going trade or 
business" test,68 which appears closely analogous to the House's 
proposed ''operating business'' concept discarded by the Senate 
in favor of the active business test. 
Beyond the preoperating business question, it is clear that a 
corporation operating as a going concern may be engaged in a 
trade or business without producing current profit or income.69 
Thus, it may be concluded that at least where a corporation is 
engaged in a trade or business under the traditional tests and 
also meets the active business activities and objecth·e criteria 
tests of Rafferty, it should qualify as an active business despite 
the fact that it may not be currently generating profit or income. 
An example would be if a corporation like Anmarcon had immedi-
ately begun reconstruction or expansion of improvements upon 
by reconstructing the damaged plant-a factual pattern closely analogous to that in 
Spheeris. Thus, the split-off corporation in Splu:eris was arguably conduding nn active 
business under this approach. 
67 Reg. § 1.248-1(a). 
68 See John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 10921 1099 (1961). 
69 See Stephens, Inc. v. United States, 464 F.2d 53, 6-1-65 (8th Cir. 1972). It may 
be noted that although the Rafferty court approved functional di\'isions muler section 
355, the Tax Court has held that in a highly integrated enterpriEe comlueted through 
multiple corporations, the management entity earns the entire income of the enterprise. 
Mare's Big Boy Prospect, Inc., 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971 ). 
But see Your Host, Ine., 58 T.C. No. 2 (1972). Thus, spun-off noumnuagement functions 
would be actively eondueting a business without produeing income. 
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being spun off but was unable to lease to commercial tenants 
until a year or so later. A further variant of this problem is 
whether active conduct of a business requires profit as well as 
production of income: an example would be a used car business 
that only breaks even, but is nevertheless necessary to dispose of 
used cars acquired in a new car business.70 In summation, to the 
extent the provisions of the regulations approved in Spheeris 
require a group of activities to be carried on fol' the purpose of 
earning current income or profit to qualify as a business under 
section 355 they are not in all instances a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute.71 
AcTIVE BusiNEss REGULATIONS AFTER Rafferty 
At this point a recapitulation of the current status of the active 
business regulations is in order. The starting point is that despite 
their heading, ''active business,'' they do not profess to define 
an active trade or business, rather they state that ''without regard 
to such rules (specific active conduct of a trade or business rules), 
for purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a 
specific existing group of activities," meeting the requirements 
set forth in the regulations.72 When these requirements are com-
pared with the development of the term ''trade or business,'' as 
usually used in the Code, they lose much of their efficacy. 
It seems the Treasury believes the term ''trade or business'' is 
quite malleable, having contradictory meanings when desired. For 
example, the Treasury has indicated that the standard meaning 
of the term "is not limited to integrated aggregates of assets, 
activities and good will which comprise businesses for the purposes 
of certain other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.'' 78 This 
definition clearly conflicts with the definition of tmde or business 
provided in the regulations under section 355. Of course, use by 
one section of terms also used in another section calls for prac-
tical and sensible interpretation in fitting the adopted terms 
into the adopting statute.74 Here the only guidance as to any spe-
1o See Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971) (court assumed 
arguendo that predistribution used car business constituted active business, but noh•d 
absence of profit; such business was not continued after distribution). 
71 Corum 'r v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 406, 501 (1948) (regulnUona thnt 
are reasonable and consistent interpretations of statutory provisions must bo sustained). 
12 Reg. § 1.355-1 (c). 
73 Reg. § 1.513-1(b). The term "trade or business" in this definition has tho sumo 
meaning as in section 162. 
74 WarrPn R. Miller, Sr., 51 T.C. 755, 761 (1968). 
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cial meaning to be assigned to the term "trade or business" is the 
function of the active conduct of a trade or business requirement : 
"to prevent the tax free separation of actire and inactire assets 
into active and inactive corporate entities." ;:; Measured against 
this purpose, the regulations defining "active" business or trade 
or business for purposes of section 355 by and large do not con-
stitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute nor do they 
reflect congressional intent. 
Their requirement of independent production of income was 
expressly rejected by the First Circuit in Rafferty-a result 
concurred in by the Sixth Circuit in King. Similarly, the exclusion 
from trade or business status of the operation of owner-occupied 
real estate is implicitly rejected. The "incidental activity" con-
cept-an activity incidental to the principal business or an inciden-
tal use of property used primarily in the principal business does 
not constitute a trade or business 70-is contained in the same 
proviso of the regulations as the erroneous independent produc-
tion of income doctrine and appears to reflect the two business 
requirements rejected by Coady. Furthermore, its probable 
broader basis, the theory that an active business must include 
every step in the process of earning income, is implicitly rejected 
by Rafferty in its conclusion that the Coady rationale applies to 
a functional division. As one commentator has pointed out, spun-
off assets that comprise merely a single step or an incidental, as 
well as an integral, function in the total enterprise should qualify 
under the active business requirement ''if they reflect a substan-
tial level of business activity." 77 Broad readings of the require-
ment of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning 
income or profit from only such activities, though not directly 
questioned by Rafferty, are incompatible with its reasoning.78 In 
short, the only provision of the active business regulations un-
touched directly or indirectly by the First Circuit's opinion is 
the exclusion from trade or business status of the J10lding for 
investment purposes of stock, securities, land or other property. 
75 Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771, 777 (1960), a[f'd per curiam, !'!89 F.!'!d 490 (Gth 
Cir. 1961). 
16 Isabel A. Elliot, 32 T.C. 283, 280-90 (1959); accord, Theodore F. Appleby, a:; 
T.C. 755, 763 (1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1DG2). 
11 BITTKER & EusTICE, FEDERAL IncoME T.t.X.\TION OF C-onFun.\TI•ms .um Su.uu:. 
HOLDERS 13-15-13-16 (3d ed. 1971). 
1s Bonsall and Appleby, which appear inconsistent wilb tl1e Rafferty sanction of a 
functional division of owner·occupied real estate, rest in part on the regulation 'a re· 
quirement of inclusion of every operation which forms a stt:p in the process of earning 
income. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
474 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27: 
Although the appellate court in Rafferty liberalized the active 
business test, it did so with the express design of utilizing instead 
the device test where a distribution possesses considerable poten-
tial for a bail-out of earnings and profi.ts.79 Accordingly, where a 
vertically integrated business is separated, and particularly, if 
real estate primarily used in the enterprise is separated, the 
focus may be expected to shift from the active business test, which 
heretofore has been the most troublesome requirement of section 
355, to the device test. 
Device Test 
GENERAL 
As a prerequisite to a tax-free corporate separation under sec-
tion 355 the Code also requires that the division not be used 
''principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings and 
profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corpora-
tion or both.'' 80 The regulations under the device clause speak 
to four areas: (1) sale of the spun-off stock, (2) continuity of 
interest, (3) proportion of liquid assets of both corporations, and 
(4) relationship of the device test to the active business require-
ments.81 They consider post distribution sales that are not pursuant 
to an arrangement agreed upon prior to the distribution as well as 
prearranged sales as evidence that the transaction was used prin-
cipally as a device. 82 This focus of the regulations on post disti·ibu-
tion sales is reinforced by their incorporation of the continuity of 
79 "We prefer this approach [i.e., device test, requiring taxpayer showing of busi· 
ness purpose germane to continuance of corporate business whore transaction has 
considerable bail-out potential] over reliance upon formulations such as 'business pur· 
pose', and 1 active business.' " Rafferty v. Comm 'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971). 
80 I.R.C. § 355(a) (1) (B). 
s1 Reg. § 1.355-2(b). 
82 Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1). Lest the Service take the view that every spin off followed 
by a sale violated the device provision, Congress added a parontlJCtical to tho device 
clause: "(but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock or securities 
in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged (other U1an pursuant to an 
arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be con· 
strued to mean that the transaction was used principally as such a device)." Sco 
COHEN, CORPORATE SEPARATIONS-GENERAL REQUIREMENTS A-13 (B.N.A. 233 T.M. 1969). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the regulations interpret this to mean that a nonprearrangod 
sale is also evidence of a device, but not determinative. Apparently in 11 this ratl10r 
subtle way" a greater onus was intended to be placed on prearrangetl sales. Id. at .A-1•! 
n.38. However, the prearranged sale exception in the statute bas also been interpreted 
as permitting prearrangements to be construed as showing a device, but not requiring 
that conclusion. Mary Archer W. Morris Trust, 42 T.C. 779, 790 (1964), atf'd, 307 
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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interest doctrine 83 : ''Section 355 contemplates a continuity of the 
entire business enterprise under modified corporate forms and a 
continuity of interest in all or part of such business enterprise on 
the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the own-
ers of the enterprise prior to the distribution or exchange .... '' 84 
The other principal focus of the device regulations is on the pro-
portion of active business assets held by the postdistribution 
corporation. For example, in application of a facts and cir-
cumstances approach to determine if a transaction was used 
principally as a device, 
consideration will be given to the nature, k-ind and amount of the assets 
of both corporations . . . immediately after the transaction. The fact 
that at the time of the transaction substantially all of the assets of each 
of the corporations involved are and have been used in the active 
conduct of trades or businesses . . . will be considered evidence that 
the transaction was not used principally as such a device.s:~ 
Thus, a distribution may constitute a device because of bail-out 
potential even though the distributee does not sell the stock or 
securities. For these regulations emphasize that in determining 
whether a distribution is a device, the percentage of active busi-
ness assets held by the controlled and distributing corporations 
will be taken into account.86 It would appear that if only a small 
percentage of either corporation's assets are business assets, a 
rebuttable inference is created that the transaction is a device. 
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the nonbusiness 
assets should constitute less than half of both corporations' assets 
if such device inference is to be overcome.87 Similar unofficial rules 
of thumb were originally set up by the Service. under the active 
business test: At least half of the assets to be separated bad (1) to 
83 The classic continuity of interest doctrine requires both a continuity of the busi-
ness enterprise under a modified corporate form and a continuity of interest tberein 
on the part of those persons who were the owners of enterprise prior to the transaction. 
Reg. § 1.368-1(b). This doctrine, however, conflicts witb tl1e statute itself: (1) n 
non pro rata division (such as a split up with two 50 per cent shareholders each re-
ceiving a 100 per cent interest in one of the postdistribuUon corporations), expressly 
authorized by section 355(a) {2) (A), violates the classic continuity of interest doctrine 
since tbere is only a 50 per cent shareholder enrryo\·cr into the resulting corporations; 
and (2) a postdistribution, but not prearranged sale, which in some instances is 
sanctioned by tbe parenthetical contained in section 355(n) {1) (B), would also break 
continuity. 
84 Reg. § 1.355-2(e). 
8s Reg. § 1.355-2{b){3). 
86 Cohen, Partial Liquidations and Spin·Of!s of Real Estate Corporations, 21 N.Y.U. 
!NST. 685, 709 (1963). 
87 Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Of!, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 10. 
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be five years old, (2) to constitute more than half of the fair 
market value of the new corporation, and (3) to be projected to 
produce more than half of the future income.88 These tests have 
fallen into disrepute under the active business test. It may be 
noted that in their suggested reincarnation under the device test, 
five year aging for business assets is not thought necessary. The 
above outline of the device regulations manifests that the Service 
sees the relationship between the device and active business tests 
as being very limited: If substantially all the assets of both corpo-
rations are used in active business, an inference arises that the 
spin-off was not used principally as a device. Indeed, one com-
mentator maintains that the essential weakness of the active busi-
ness concept as fashioned by the current regulations is that whether 
the transaction satis:fies the active business rules llas very little 
effect on the determination of whether the transaction constitutes 
a device.89 
The device restriction, however, is not the only anti-bail-out 
defense relied upon by the Service in addition to the active 
business requirement. Under regulations entitled, ''Business pur-
pose,'' the Treasury has taken the position that transactions will 
not qualify under section 355 : 
where carried out for purposes not germane to the business of the 
corporations. The principal reason for this requirement is to limit the 
application of section 355 to certain specified distributions or exchnng('s 
... incident to such readjustment of corporate structures as is required 
by business exigencies and which, in general, effect only a readjustment 
of continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms .... 
All the requisites of business and corporate purposes described under 
§ 1.368 must be met to exempt a transaction from the recognition of gain 
or loss under this section.90 
Although the device test is itself descended from Gregory v. 
Helvering,01 in which it was linked with the business purpose 
doctrine, the Commissioner has argued that the business purpose 
doctrine exists independently of the device clause. The Ninth 
Circuit has accepted this argument, denying the benefits of section 
355 to a transaction that the Tax Court found complied with all 
the literal requirements of the statute including the device clause, 
88 See Caplin, Corporate Division Under the 1954 Code: A New Approach to tl10 
Five-Year "Active Business" Rule, 43 VA. L. REV. 387, 403-0•1 (1957). 
89 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations 
Under tlle 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194, 1256 n.292 (1968). 
90 Reg. § 1.355-2 (c). 
91 293 u.s. 469 (1935). 
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but which the appellate court concluded had no business reason.0~ 
This doctrine has many ramifications. For example, the Service 
argues that a distinction should be drawn between corporate and 
shareholder purposes. However, the courts have refused by and 
large to make this distinction; the new tack that the Rafferty 
court has taken in this area is discussed below. In addition, such 
a purpose has been required for the distribution of stock and 
securities in the spun-off corporation as well as for the initial 
separation of the assets into subsidiary status.03 The former 
business purpose is thought to be most troublesome in spin-offs 
and other pro rata transactions. 
One commentator surveying such extra statutory judicial doc-
trines as the business purpose doctrine and continuity of interest 
and the reliance placed on them in comparison with the restricted 
view of the device clause displayed by the Service (as in Revenue 
Ruling 64-102 94 in which the Treasury indicated that it viewed 
the device requirement as a dividend equivalency test) has con-
cluded that rather than reading the device pro,•ision broadly, 
the Service has chosen to rely on the familiar reorganization 
judicial doctrines.95 Here, too, Rafferty charts a new course. 
Rafferty: DEVICE AND BAIL-OuT PoTENTIAL 
In Rafferty the government's alternative position in the Ta.'"\: 
Court had been that the taxpayer had not shown a valid corporate 
business purpose for incorporating the business premises of the 
controlling corporation and subsequently distributin~ th£' stoek in 
the real estate subsidiary. The Tax Court accepted tltC' taxpayer's 
contention that restructuring his stockholdings to facilitate estate 
planning and to avoid possible future interfamily conflict that 
might interfere with the operations of the controlling corporation 
92 CQmm 'r v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965). 
93 Estate of Parshelsky v. CQmm 'r, 303 F.2d 14, ~0 (2d Cir. 196~). 
941964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136. See also Rev. Rul. 71-383, 19il-::l C'.B. Hlll; Re\·. Rul. 
71-384, 1971-2 C.B. 181. This stress on dividend equivnlenl'y-if till' tr.msal'tion ab-
sent section 355 would gh·e rise to capital gain or loss, ratbl'r tbnn dh·itlcnd incomC', 
it does not constitute a device-is likely to be confined to split·U]lS and !:iplit·ofis that 
are non pro rata in character under section 302(b)(::l). Altlwugb this apl'ruaelt lm<J 
been criticized as an abdication of power by the Service, sec Wbitman, Dramin9 t1u• 
Serbonian Bog: .A New .Approach to Corporate Separations Under t11c 195J Cotlc, 81 
HARv. L. REV. 1194, 1237 (1968), to the e.·dent thnt such bx lore from the !lh·idt:nd 
equivalency area as the "strict net effect" test is thereby importetl, the sam.- qul':>tions 
will be raised as under the bail-out potentiality npproacl1 adopted in Raffcrtu, at least 
where the distribution is non pro rata. 
s~ Whitman, Draining tlle Serbonian Bog: ..4. New ..4.pproac1l to Corporate Scparationa 
Under tlie 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. REV. 11941 1239 (1968). 
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constituted an adequate business purpose for the separation and 
distribution of the subsidiary's stock.96 As to the corporate pur~ 
pose versus shareholder purpose distinction urged by the Service, 
the Tax Court thought it unrealistic to distinguish between them 
in the case before it but acknowledged that it would draw a dis~ 
tinction in cases where the shareholder purpose was incom~ 
patible with the business purpose requirements of section 355.97 
The appellate court agreed that a shareholder purpose could in 
some instances save a transaction from condemnation as a device. 
However, it viewed the correct rule to be that ''a distribution 
which has considerable potential for use as a device for distribut~ 
ing earnings and profits should not qualify for tax free treatment 
on the basis of personal motives unless those motives are germane 
to the continuance of the corporate business.'' 98 Stated another 
way, if in other respects the transaction was a device, the per~ 
sonal shareholder purpose in Rafferty could not satisfy the 
taxpayer's burden of proving that the transaction was not being 
used principally as a device. The court preferred this approach 
to reliance upon such formulations as business purpose and active 
business. 
Thus, Rafferty reversed the trend favored by the Service of 
emphasis on the active business requirement and judicial doc~ 
trines instead of the device restriction to combat potential bail~ 
outs. Such reversal of tactics had been advocated by Whitman,99 
a commentator upon whom the circuit relied in supporting its 
approach. Whitman had objected to the predominant role as-
signed to the active business requirement on the grounds that it 
channeled analysis into a definitional approach-whether a busi-
ness was active rather than transactional, whether the particular 
oe The plan incorporated two objectives: (1) exclusions of daughters (taxpayer l1ad 
four daughters and five sons) and future sons-in-law from activo management of tho 
principal (steel) business and (2) providing the daughters with investment assets 
that produced a steady income, as opposed to the violently 1luctunting income of tho 
steel business. 54 T.C. 490, 493-94, 496 (1970). 
97 [T)here are certain instances where a distinction between a corporate purpose and 
a shareholder purpose must be recognized, i.e., where a distribution is effected solely 
for the purpose of enabling a shareholder to 1 milk' the parent corporation; whore 
a distribution is effected for the purpose of meeting the personal obligations of tho 
shareholders of the parent corporation and where a distribution is offrctod solely 
for the purpose of reducing accumulated earnings and profits of tho parent corpora· 
tion which have been permitted to accumulate beyond its reasonable needs. 
54 T.C. at 497. 
98 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971). 
99 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: ..4. New Approach to Corporate Separations 
Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1245, 1252-53 (1968). 
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separation should be allowed tax-free treatment.100 Similarly, 
it was thought that a business purpose focus would lead to an 
abstract, almost definitional approach. A strengthened device test 
was proposed under which the taxpayer would have the burden 
of proving lack of device-until recently the Service had, in 
effect, assumed that burden. In essence the taxpayer would have 
to show that he was entitled to tax deferral as to his corporate 
separation. Suggested factors to be considered included business 
reasons, absence of a postdistribution sale, lack of dividend equiv-
alency, and likelihood of bail-out. In short, most of the factors 
traditionally utilized by the Service and courts would still be 
available, but particular factors would no longer be crystalized 
as conclusive. The active business test would be quite restricted, 
but the thrust of the present device regulations as to the propor-
tion of active business assets strengthened-the more liquid the 
assets of a postdistribution corporation were, the more likely 
that the transaction would constitute a device, even if there were 
good business reasons for the division. 
The Rafferty court followed Whitman's overall proposed ap-
proach in broad outline. Its starting point was that the ta.\.-payer 
has the burden of proving that the transaction was not used 
principally as a device.101 There was a strong indication that busi-
ness purpose is relevant only with respect to the issue of whether 
the taxpayer has shown that the transaction is not a device and 
has no independent significance. The active business test was 
perforce downgraded in importance with the repudiation of vir-
tually all the provisos of the active business regulations. How-
ever, the most significant step taken by Rafferty was adoption of 
a transactional approach: whether the substance of the transaction 
was to leave the taxpayer in a position to distribute the earnings 
and profits of the corporation away from or out of the business 
without impairing his equity interest in the corporation. The 
content of this focus on bail-out potential in turn owes much to 
the analysis of Bittker and Eustice, the leading commentators 
in this area.102 
100 za. at 1211, 1215-16, 1256-57. 
101 The cireuit eourt relied for this purpose upon a decision (Marne S. Wilson, 42 
T.C. 914 (1964), rev'a on other grounils, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965)) thnt bns been 
deseribed as offering a promise of a new use for device-'' n. trnnsnetionnl tl?St with 
elements eonsidered as faetors not terms"-nnd which nllocated the burden of proving 
nondeviee to the taxpayer. 81 HARv. L. REV. at 1245, 1244. 
102 BITTKE& & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION Oi' C<lRPOilATIONS A!:D SIIAim· 
HOLDERS 13-28 (3d ed. 1971). 
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ScoPE OF Rafferty DEVICE APPROACH 
The court measured bail-out potentiality by two factors. The 
first was the well established factor of readily realizable value 
or proportion of liquid assets. The second was more directly 
responsive to the underlying theory of a bail-out: whether sale 
of the spun-off assets would adversely affect the shareholders of 
the ongoing corporation. The First Circuit pointed out that a 
spun-off corporation could be actively conducting a business, but, 
if it was based principally on highly liquid investment type 
assets, it would still have readily realizable value. The significance 
of whether a sale would impair control over the ongoing business 
lay in the conclusion that if it would, then the likelihood of bail-out 
was slight. "If sale would adversely affect the shareholders of the 
on-going company, the assets cannot be said to be sufficiently 
separated from the corporate solution and the gain sufficiently 
crystallized to be taxable.'' 103 In the case before it, the court 
determined that the land and buildings held by the spun-off 
corporation and in which the distributing corporation carried 
on its steel operations were not so distinctive that the sale of 
the spun-off corporation would impair the continued operation 
of the distributing corporation or that such sale would in any 
other way impair the taxpayer's control and other equity interests 
in the distributing corporation. The court noted that this deter-
mination was reinforced by the fact that the distributing corpora-
tion was guaranteed occupancy of the property under a long-term 
lease at fixed rents. 
At first blush, this factor would appear irrelevant to determin-
ing whether a bail-out exists since the spun-off corporation is taxed 
at ordinary income rates on the amounts received in the intercom-
pany transactions.104 Closer analysis reveals the bail-out potential. 
The goal of any bail-out is to circumvent the double taxation 
inherent in dividend distributions-one tax at the corporate 
level on the profits of the venture and a second tax at the share-
holder level on the distribution of such profits to the shareholders. 
In a Rafferty type arrangement, in effect, only the lessor cor-
poration pays a corporate tax on the portion of the profits 
of the ongoing steel venture that are paid for rent since the lessee 
deducts such "rent." 105 If after accumulation of such "rent" 
10s 452 F.2d 767, 771 (1st Cir. 1971). 
1041.R.C. § 61(a)(5). 
105 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SIIAUF!• 
HOLDERS 13-15 (3d ed. 1971) (implication that siphoning off futuro earnings mn.y 
constitute a bail-out arrangement). 
0 
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profits the spun-off corporation is disposed of at capital gain 
rates, arguably a bail-out has occurred at least as to the accumu-
lated rental income . .Although provisions such as section 482 can 
police this area by reaching excessive rental payments/00 a fair 
market value rental charge would appear immune from attack 107 
unless the spun-off corporation is a sham or the entire enterprise 
is considered a single integrated enterprise and the Service suc-
cessfully applies the "generation of income doctrine" under sec-
tion 482 to reallocate the net income of the entire venture to 
one taxpayer. Thus, the device clause may well be the Service's 
last major line of defense in this area since the accumulated 
earnings tax imposes only an upper limit on the amount of post-
distribution earnings that can be bailed out by this technique, or 
more aptly device. 
Impairment ·of Equity 
The appellate opinion approvingly quoted commentators de-
fining a bail-out as a drawing off of earnings and profits without 
impairing the shareholder's residual equity interest in the ongoing 
corporation's earning power, growth potential or voting control. 
The court added little to this definition other than to indicate that 
a device was not present if retention of the spun-off salable 
assets was needed to continue the business or if their sale would 
harm the taxpayer's control and other equity interest. 
Impairment of voting control appears at first blush clear-cut; 
however, the question of the degree to which attribution rules 
are to be applied to determine voting control before and after 
the division is not as clear. No exact parallel to impairment of 
growth potential and earning power is presented under existing 
Code provisions. The "essentially equivalent to a dividend" pro-
visions 108 offer the closest analogy since they, too, are concerned 
with bail-outs. Indeed, in the application of the "strict net effect" 
doctrine 109 developed under section 302(b){l), one court has gone 
l.06Ibiil. (assignment of income doctrine, sections 446(b) and 48:1 can be employed 
if anticipated manipulation occurs). 
1.01 Reg. §§ 1.482-2(c)(l) and (2). 
10s See I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(l), 346(a)(2), and 356(a)(2); Reg. § 1.30G-3(d) ("cash 
substitution" test). 
1o9 Under the "strict net effect" test, a court hypothesizes a situation where tho 
corporation did not redeem any stock, but instead declared a dividend in an amount 
equal to the amount actually distributed in exchnngo for the stock redeemed. Then it 
compares, from the shareholder's vantage point, the "hypothetical" situation after 
the dividend with the actual situation after the redemption. Tho redemption is "essen· 
tially equivalent to a dividend" whenever tho results (e.g., payments received and 
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beyond mere hypothetical dividend consequences to consider rela-
tive changes with respect to shareholder rights to share in cor-
porate earnings and to share in net assets on liquidation.110 
However, because this approach is intended to focus on changes 
at the shareholder level, its utility in development of the concept 
of impairment of equity would be limited to non pro rata distribu-
tions. Arguably, such distributions can never be used to bail out 
earnings and profits where the distributee shareholders' interests 
in the controlling corporation are completely terminated. There-
fore, consideration of the net effect test is appropriate only where 
there has been a meaningful reduction of the distributee share-
holders' interests in the remaining corporation, 111 but not a com-
plete termination. 
At least where section 355 distributions are proportionate,112 
guidance as to the contours of the impairment of equity doctrine 
must be sought in dividend equivalency approaches other than 
the net effect test. The Rafferty focus on whether sale of the 
spun-off real estate would impair the continued operation of the 
ongoing steel company business calls to mind the ''corporate 
contraction'' doctrine 113 applied to partial liquidations under 
section 346(a) (2). This doctrine, however, in its pristine form is 
broader than impairment of equity since it would permit, for 
example, distribution of the proceeds of sale of unwanted operat-
ing assets and the working capital attributable to termination of 
a business activity.114 Guidance here would therefore be limited 
to whether the distribution (not termination) of a part of the 
ongoing business is sufficient to contract or restrict the continu-
ance of the ongoing corporation's operations. Even if the sale 
of the distributed assets would impair the continued operations, 
the pattern of stockholder control) from the hypothetical dividend and tho actual 
redemption are the same. 
110 Himmel v. Comm 'r, 338 F.2d 815, 818-20 (2d Cir. 1964). 
111 Cf. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Note, United States v. Davis: 
What Remains of Section 802(b)(1)?, 13 Wlii. & MARY L. REV. 202, 208-09 (1971). 
112 It is possible that whore distributions are disproportionate tho taxpnyor will 
have to show that the sale of the distributed stock would not only impair his equity 
interests ("net effect") in the distributing corporation but also would impair its 
continued operations ("contraction"). However, Rafferty speaks of those two facota 
of impairment of equity in the alternative. 
ua One commentator has reasoned that a functional division involving for example 
assets connected with a coal mine or a research department would result in 11 a cor· 
porate contraction in operating assets'' and accordingly concluded that such divisions 
merit tax deferral. Massee, Section 855: Disposal of Unwanted .d.ssets in Connection 
with a Reorganigation, 22 TAX L. REV. 439, 463 (1967). 
114 Rev. Rul. 60-232, 1960-2 C.B. 115. 
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Rafferty implies that the further question of whether the ongoing 
corporation can readily replace such assets must be asked.116 
The uncertainties which exist in the contraction doctrine 
prompted the active business safe harbor of section 346(b). Thus, 
paradoxically, Rafferty has swung full circle from the section 355 
active business restriction intended to police bail-outs to an im-
pairment of capital approach similar to the judicial doctrine which 
in another provision led to adoption of an active business provision 
as a safe harbor. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the peri-
meters of this concept are yet to be fully charted and that it may 
prove to be the soft spot of the Rafferty approach in terms of 
predictability for tax planning, it is more responsive than the 
active business requirement to the question of whether the trans-
action offers such bail-out potentiality that it is not entitled 
to tax deferral. The active business restriction suffers from being 
both too narrow and broad since whether the transaction satisfies 
the active business rules has very little effect on the determina-
tion of device.U6 
In addition to unanswered questions as to what constitutes an 
impairment of equity, an unresolved issue going to the heart of 
the concept of bail-out potentiality is the continued significance 
under this doctrine of postdistribution sales. The question is pre-
sented by alternative constructions of the impairment of equity 
factor: (1) if a sale would impair the taA.!)ayer's equity in the 
continuing business, even should it occur such a sale would not 
likely result in a bail-out, or (2) if a sale would impair the tax-
payer's equity, the likelihood of a sale itself would be slight and, 
therefore, the likelihood of a bail-out via a sale would. also be 
slight. The significance of the latter construction is in its basic 
premise that any sale (even one which impairs residual equity) 
constitutes strong evidence of a device. Although both interpreta-
tions would lead to the same result as long as there is no sale, 
ns Clearly the distributing corporation would require some facilities (the spun-off 
assets consisted primarily of its business premises) in which to conduct its stecl 
operations. Rafferty held that the land and buildings in which the distributing cor· 
poration carried on its steel operations were not so distinctive that their sale would 
impair the continuance of those operations. Consequently, tbe court must have meant 
that their sale would not impair tbe continuance of tbe business of the ongoing com· 
pany beeause they could be easily replaced. 
ua As the Rafferty opinion points out, "[e]ven if both corporations are actively 
engaged in their respective trades, if one of tbem is a business based principally on 
highly liquid investment-type passive assets, tbc potential for a bail-out is re!ll.'' 
452 F.2d at 771. 
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different conclusions might be reached where a postdistribution 
sale did occur. 
The question is drawn into sharper focus by examination of 
Bittker and Eustice's critical analysis of the theory that a post-
distribution sale is a method of bailing out earnings and profits. 
They point out : 
Such a sale spells a loss of control of one of the businesses (and a 
loss of the seller's share in the corporation's earning power and growth 
potential as well), whereas a bail-out ordinarily means that earnings 
and profits have been drawn off without impairing the shareholder's 
residual equity interest in the corporation's earning power, growth 
potential, or voting control.117 
Assuming that the active business test did not permit segregation 
of cash or investment property in a corporation and distribution 
of its stock under section 355, they concluded that the bail-out 
analogy was invalid.118 Thus, their analysis indicated that a sale, 
prearranQ;ed or not, of stock of a postdistribution corporation that 
was actively conducting a trade or business could not constitute a 
device. However, under the Rafferty active business test liquid 
assets can be held in an active corporation (for example, rental 
real estate business not restricted to granting net leases). Conse-
quently, merely passing the active business test cannot preclude 
a finding that the transaction violated the device test. But if the 
sale would impair the taxpayer's equity interest in the continuing 
corporation, then, following the logic of these commentators' 
reasoning, such a sale would not be analogous to a bail-out. Since 
this appears the only possible synthesis of the Rafferty active 
business approach and Bittker and Eustice's critique of the bail-
out concept, it is probable that the court intended that impairment 
of equity made the likelihood of a bail-out minimal even if there 
were a postdistribution sale. In addition, it may be argued that 
had the court meant to equate such a sale with a bail-out as the 
other construction does, it could have done so expressly. 
The factors militating towards an interpretation in which a 
bail-out is equated with sale (but such a sale is unlikely because 
it would impair the continuing equity interest) do not arise from 
the theory underlying the bail-out concept or its common meaning 
but rather from the context in which the court used the term. 
For example, the court stated: 
117 BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SnARE• 
HOLDERS 13-28 (3d eel. 1971). 
us I d. at 13-29. 
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If the taxpayers could not effect a bail-out without thereby impairing 
their control over the on-going business, the faet that a bail-out is 
theoretically possible should not be enough to demonstrate a device 
because the likelihood of it ever being so used is slight.110 
Yet under the Bittker and Eustice view, a sale which would impair 
such control could never constitute a bail-out and, thus, is not e\·en 
theoretically possible. However, if the word sale is substituted 
for ''bail-out,'' the same contradiction does not arise. Thus, bail-
out seems to possess a broader meaning in Rafferty. Furthermore, 
the court stated that if a sale would adversely affect the ta.xpayer's 
residual equity, the assets could not be said to be sufficiently 
separated from the corporate solution and the gain sufficiently 
crystallized to be taxable. The authority for this statement, an 
earlier First Circuit split-off and liquidation-reincorporation de-
cision, contains a paraphrase of it that served merely as a re-
formulation of the continuity of interest doctrine.12° Consequently, 
if the Rafferty hypothesis that a sale which impairs residual equity 
does not constitute a device due to the slight likelihood of its use 
to ·bail out earnings and profits, is tested against the original 
version and context of this crystallization of gain metaphor, it 
fails. For a sale of the taxpayer's total interest in one of the 
postdistribution corporations violates the continuity of interest 
doctrine. To coexist with the continuity of interest doctrine im-
pairment of capital must render both a sale and a bail-out highly 
unlikely, thus, the terms might as well be synonymous. 
While equating sale and bail-out solves some minor conceptual 
lacunae in the Rafferty opinion, to do so requires more than a 
little casuistic reasoning. More fundamentally, the position that 
a sale is not a device if it impairs residual equity and therefore 
is probably not being used as a bail-out, is more consistent with 
119 Rafferty v. Comm.'r, 452 F.2d 767, 771 (1st Cir. 1971). 
120 Lewis v. Comm 'r, 176 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1949): "What is controlling is 
that in both the 'popular and economic sense', and the intendment of the statute, 
considerations of 'boot' aside, gain or loss is not sufficiently crystallized for recog-
nition by the mere transfer of a going business to another corporation for operation 
indefinitely; 'the collective interests still remained in solution. 1 " 
Liquidation-reincorporation refers to the situation in whieh shareholders of the 11 old 
corporation" liquidate it, withdraw accumulated earnings usunlly in the form of 
cash at capital gain rates, and obtain a stepped-up fair market value basis for tho 
other assets, which are then transferred with a carryover basis to a "new corporation" 
owned in substantially the same proportions. One of the Service's counteraUnc.ks is 
that the entire transaction constitutes a reorganization with the ensh being distributed 
as a boot dividend under seetion 356(a.)(2), or preferably as a. functionally unrelated 
dividend under section 30L 
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a transactional approach. The latter interpretation should and is 
likely to be the accepted reading of the Rafferty decision and the 
significance of postdistribution sales, prearranged or not, and the 
continuity of interest doctrine may be expected to be minimal 
where the Rafferty approach is followed. 
A ramification of the bail-out potential approach involves a 
transaction that eliminates residual equity in one of the post-
distribution corporations, such as a non pro rata split-up or 
split-off in which each group of shareholders possesses a con-
tinuing interest in only one of the corporations resulting from the 
division. Certainly a sale by one of the groups of their entire 
interest cannot be used to bail out earnings, rather it is more like 
a complete termination of interest.121 It should be noted that here 
the usual alternative to tax deferral will not be ordinary income, 
but 
would presumably constitute a redemption in complete termination of 
the interest of one group of stockholders, so that the only tax incidents 
(absent § 355) would be at capital gains rates on those stockholders who 
give up their old stock in exchange for the stock of the new corporation. 
Nevertheless, the failure to obtain complete tax immunity in such cir-
cumstances could seriously impede the resolution of deadlock situations, 
since it would add to the other issues in controversy the question of 
which group of stockholders should bear this capital gains tax.122 
While the absence of an equity interest in both corporations re-
moves the danger of a bail-out, it also removes the brake on 
postdistribution sales of corporate assets with readily realizable 
value. In these circumstances it might be felt that the gain is 
sufficiently crystallized to be recognized; however, to do so 
would entail resuscitating the pre-Rafferty version of the active 
business restriction or giving the continuity of interest doctrine 
untoward emphasis. The simplest solution, therefore, is to grant 
tax deferral to divisions with complete terminations of interest 
in one of the resulting corporations if they pass the Rafferty 
121 Cf. Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136; accord, Rev, Rul. 71-593, 1971-2 
C.B. 181, which said that in the absence of section 355, the trnnsaction would have 
been taxed as a capital gain to distributees under tho termination of interest rcdemp· 
tion safe harbor; therefore, no potential dividend income was being bnilcd out of tho 
parent and, consequently, the transaction did not violate the device clause. 
122 HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 932 (1966). Sections 302(b) (2) and (b) (3) 
provide mechanical tests under which redemptions qualify for capital gain treat· 
ment. Significantly under the latter safe harbor ("complete termination of inter• 
est") the attribution rules of section 318 are waived in some, but not all, instances. 
I.R.C. § 302(c) (2). 
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active business requirement.123 Should this approach prove to be 
a means of avoiding the attribution rules applicable to a com-
plete termination of interest under the redemption provisions, a 
solution would be to use those rules to determine whether the 
transaction has bail-out potential, i.e., attribute to such ta.'\.-payers 
the residual interest of related parties in the other corporation 
and then determine whether a sale would impair such interest.12' 
This is another area in which the expanded device test is a more 
flexible guard against bail-outs than the active business require-
ment. Since the latter does not draw a distinction between pro 
rata and non pro rata divisions, any stretching of the active busi-
ness test to permit a particular non pro rata separation worthy of 
tax deferral becomes equally applicable to pro rata divisions. 
The Sixth Circuit in King, in its application of the Rafferty 
bail-out potential approach, manifests some of the difficulties in 
this approach. The Tax Court had not reached the Commissioner's 
device or business purpose alternative contentions, and the gov-
ernment on appeal argued that if the active business issue were 
reversed, the case should be remanded to the Ta.x Court for 
further :findings on these issues. A concurring and dissenting 
opinion agreed, but the majority, apparently not fully compre-
hending the Rafferty reformulation of device, proceeded to rule 
on these issues as well. 
Its starting point was that all the transactions involved were 
motivated by valid business purposes. Next it concluded that 
since the stock of spun-off corporations was immediately ex-
changed in an amalgamating reorganization for stock in a sister 
corporation of the distributing parent corporation (thus the dis-
tributee stockholders owned both a trucking corporation and a 
separate holding company with terminal leasing subsidiaries), the 
distributed stocks were locked into the holding company as securely 
as they had been locked into the parent truck line operating cor-
123 See Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: ..4. New .J.pproacl1 to Corporate 
Separations Under the 1954 Coile, 81 HARV. L. REV. 11941 1::!55 (19GS) (proposed 
burd~n test should not apply to transactions im·olving business diviBions between 
shareholders or complete termination of any shareholder's interest via a split·ofi 
because these transactions are not capable of being used ns bill-outs). 
124 Although the attribution rules under section 318 are applicable only where 
expressly made so, I.R.C. § 318(a), and are not referred to in section 355, Revenue 
Ruling 64-102, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136, indicated a solution: The attribution rules 
would not be directly applied; rather the section 355 distribution would be compared 
with a hypothetical section 302 redemption (to which section 318 is e:qm:ssly mado 
applicable) to determine whether the transaction is capable of being used to bill out 
dividend income. 
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poration beforehand, ''and the stockholders were as far removed 
from the earnings and profits after the distribution as they had 
been before, and could not abstract any accumulated earnings at 
capital gain rates.'' 125 Thus, the majority concluded the distribu-
tion could not have been used as a device. This reasoning overlooks 
the fact that if the terminals had a readily realizable value and 
their sale would not impair the stockholder's control over the 
ongoing trucking business, the potential for a bail-out through 
sale of the separate holding company is real-the holding company 
stock was not necessarily locked into the trucking company at all. 
The King majority also held that (1) unlike the real estate in 
Rafferty which was readily salable because the improvements 
were capable of multiple use, the terminals were "single-purpose 
facilities which required specialized equipment and construction,'' 
(2) the retention of the properties by the spun off corporations 
was necessary for them to obtain financing and expand their 
facilities, and (3) a sale or liquidation would have impaired the 
continued operations of the ongoing trucking company. The 
second holding is irrelevant to bail-out potential analysis-sale 
of the spun-off assets would always impair the shareholder's 
equity in the spun-off corporation; the question is whether it. 
impairs their equity in the retained corporation and assets. rrhe 
difficulty with the first and third holdings is that nowhere in the 
Tax Court or appellate opinions are there findings as to whether 
the spun-off terminals were readily salable, and if so, whether 
sufficiently similar terminals were available for leasing or could 
be constructed, or whether a sale and leaseback was possible. 
Without the answers to these questions the majority's conchlsions 
here, although patterned after Rafferty, were without support in 
the record. It would appear that the majority was overly influ-
enced by its conclusions that the shareholders had received in 
the distribution no cash or cash equivalent with which to pay the 
tax and that all the. transactions were motivated by business 
purposes. 
125 458 F.2d at 250. Both the Tax Court and the appellate opuuon confusingly 
speak of the holding company that acquired the distributt'<l stock in ono plnco ns n 
subsidiary of the distributing corporation and as another corporntion owned by tho 
shareholders of the distributing corporation, i.e., a sister corporution. Since tlw not result 
and ostensible purpose of all the transactions was to place nil of tho trucking cor-
porations in one group and all of the trucking terminal corporations in nnothor, it 
is assumed that the holding company was a sister corporation to tho tru<'king common 
parent corporation. Otherwise after the second reorganization in which tho hohllng 
company acquired the distributed stock, it would have remained partially owned by 
the distributing corporation. 
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Business Purpose 
In Rafferty, the court found that the transaction was in other 
respects a device and, in addition, the taxpayers' personal estate 
planning motives were not germane to the continuance of the 
corporate business since the need to prevent any future man-
agement conflict that might arise from debilitating nepotism was 
remote and completely within the taxpayers' control. Therefore, 
the taxpayers did not satisfy their burden of proving that the 
distribution was not being used principally as a bail-out device. 
Significantly, the court did not use the terms ''purposes . . . 
germane to the business of the corporation" (the formulation of 
business purpose under section 1.355-2(c) of the regulations) 
but rather ''motives ... germane to the continuance of the cor-
porate business.'' 126 
This formulation of business purpose highlights the fact that in 
the eyes of the court the concept of shareholder business purpose 
is linked with the impairment of equity factor. For if the share-
holder motives are so germane, a postdistribution sale would prob-
ably retard their fulfillment. Although interrelated to the im-
pairment of equity factor, this element is not identical to it. 
For example, the spun-off corporation's assets could consist of 
real estate leased to the ongoing company that the latter could 
readily replace without contracting its continued operations. If 
the shareholder's motives were such that for other reasons he 
could not as a practical matter dispose of either of the post-
distribution corporations, then the purposes would appear germane 
to the continuance of the corporate business.127 In effect, under 
this approach a taxpayer is given another bite at the apple to 
show that the likelihood of a bail-out is slight. If he cannot show 
that a sale would impair his continuing equity so that the likeli-
hood of its use for a bail-out is slight, he may show that the likeli-
126 Rafferty v. C-omm 'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971). 
121 Bondy v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 19li9). Wliitman Buggests that 
the taxpayer in Bondy had no intention of disposing of the spun-off real estate stock 
which was collateral for his alimony obligation. "If h;:> defaulted on the alimony, his 
ex-wife would become his lessor. Business purpose or none, 111:' did not, eould not, con-
template a bail-out of earnings, and thus the trallS3ction wns not used as a device." 
81 !IARv. L. REV. at 1243. 
The Eafferty business purpose discussion required that p;:>rsonnl sharel1older moti\·es 
be germane to the continuance of the corporate business if tho transaction was in 
other respects a. device; in its summary of device the court concluded that the continued 
rentention of the salable assets was not needed to accomplish shareholder purposes. 
It may be inferred that shareholder purposes requiring retention of assets nrc ger· 
mane to continuance of the corporate business. 
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hood of a sale itself occurring (and hence a bail-out via such sale) 
is slight due to the fact that personal motives require ''the con-
tinued retention [of the salable assets] to accomplish [his] pur-
poses.'' 128 
Rafferty retained, of course, corporate business purpose as a 
possible means of showing that a transaction is not being used 
principally as a device, although it is, in other respects, a device. 
Indeed, the majority opinion in King may be justified on this 
ground. The dissent, however, believed that valid business pur-
poses did not necessarily foreclose a finding that a transaction is 
used as a device. The apparent criterion for determining if a 
corporate business purpose is present is whether the transaction 
renders ''any direct benefit to the business of the original com-
pany." Rafferty unfortunately does not indicate what degree 
of business purpose (corporate or shareholder germane to con-
tinuance of the· corporate business) must be shown to establish 
that the transaction was not being used "principally as a device" 
where the potential for a. bail-out is real. The principal purpose 
test of section 269 may offer some guidance. Regulations under 
that section, echoing legislative history-'' the section should be 
operative only if the evasion or avoidance purpose outranks, or 
exceeds in importance, any other one purpose'' 1211-provide that 
"[i]f the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds 
in importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose." 130 
This leads to the interesting question of whether a transaction is 
used principally as a device if the bail-out purpose exceeds in 
importance both a shareholder purpose germane to continuance 
of the enterprise and a corporate business purpose, when measured 
against each purpose separately, but not when measured against 
both of them. The fact that the everyday sense of principally is 
"of first importance" or "primarily," as contrasted with "essen-
tial" or "substantial," 131 suggests that the bail-out use must 
exceed all business purpose uses in the aggregate. 
If, however, the development of the "business purpose" limita-
tions of section 269 is fully applicable to section 355, this question 
12s 452 F.2d at 771. 
129 S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943). 
13o Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2). 
131 Cf. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) ("primarily" in section 1221(1) 
means "principally" or "of first importance''); see COLSON, FE!DERAL TAXATION OF 
SALES, EXCHANGES AND OTHER TRANSFERS 61 (1971) (suggesting Malat ovorrulcd 
a conflicting interpretation of "essential" or "substantial"). 
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may well prove academic since the courts, at least prior to recent 
trends, have seemed willing to give decisive weight to any reason-
able business purpose posited by the taxpayer. Nevertheless, 
''courts generally have been more receptive to the business rea-
sons which would justify separation of assets at the corporate 
level than to attempt to attain split ownership at the shareholder 
level under § 355,'' 132 and a business purpose is required for both 
the initial separation of assets into subsidiary status and the 
distribution of the subsidiary's stock to the parent's share-
holders.133 
In the context of the requirement of a separate business purpose 
for distribution of the stock of the spun-off corporation, the 
Rafferty court's observation that the alleged business purpose 
could be fully satisfied by a bail-out of dividends may prove highly 
significant. For Parshelsky, the decision adopting the requirement 
of nontax reasons, not only for the corporate division but also for 
direct ownership of both corporations by the shareholders, had 
reasoned that a business purpose which could be accomplished 
merely by separate incorporation could not justify a spin-off.134 
Due to this reasoning, commentators generalized that if a dis-
tribution by a spin-off was only one of several ways to accomplish 
a given purpose, courts might hold that the spin-off did not possess 
an adequate nontax purpose.135 In Raffedy, the court pointed out 
that the alleged business purpose of providing daughters with 
investment assets safe from the fluctuations of the .ongoing steel 
business could have been fully satisfied by payment of cash 
dividends to the taxpayers followed by their investing them to 
provide for their female descendents. This may portend an 
approach under which a business purpose for a spin-off is severely 
discounted if the same result could be obtained through payment 
of dividends. 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that since the result 
secured under most spin-offs (including some approved by the 
Service in published rulings) can be achieved without a distribu-
tion, the possibility of accomplishing the same result without a spin-
off should not be determinative tall_,' [m] en may arrange their 
132 BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL !NCOYE TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS A..,'D SIIAilli:• 
HOLDERS 15-10 (3d ed. 1971). 
133 Estate of Parshelsky v. Comm 'r, 303 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1962). 
134Ibiil. 
1as Cohen, Current Partial Liquidatwn and Spin-off Problems, 41 TAXES 7751 779-80 
(1963). 
136 lit. at 778. 
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affairs with an eye to reducing or avoiding taxes." 137 Moreover, 
even under section 269 where the previously liberal judicial atti-
tude towards business purpose has turned critical, the hardened 
attitude ''does not go so far as to compel the taxpayer to adopt 
the least favorable tax route out of several possible alterna-
tives." 138 Indeed, in a recent section 355 decision where the Gov-
ernment argued that ''assuming that there was a business purpose 
for the creation of the new company there was no business pur-
pose for the distribution of its stock since the same objective could 
have been accomplished by operating the new company as a 
subsidiary," the district court countered with the observation 
that ''it does not follow that a spin-off, prompted by valid business 
motives, can be taxed merely by showing that the same business 
purposes could have been served by some other form of reorgan-
ization." 139 Thus, it is not advisable to hold that a spin off which 
in other respects is not a device does not possess an adequate 
business purpose merely because the same result could be ob-
tained by a payment of cash dividends. Rather, under section 
355, as under section 269, the rule should be that the taxpayer 
must show that the choice of the more favorable tax route was 
motivated by business reasons at least equal to the opportunity 
to obtain the potential tax benefits in the method selected, viz., a 
bail-out of earnings and profits. 
A further business purpose question not directly answered by 
Rafferty is whether such a purpose must be evidenced for applica-
tion of section 355 even though the distributed stock cannot be 
potentially converted into cash without impairing the distributee's 
equity interest in the continuing corporation. 'l1he Ninth Circuit 
in Commissioner v. Wilson 140 has held that business purpose 
.was an independent test which must be met even after the device 
clause had been satisfied. It is significant, therefore, that tho 
Rafferty court appears to use business purpose as a threshold 
question which is triggered only by the presence of bail-out 
potential: 
[I] f, in other respects the transaction was a "device," that purpose 
could not satisfy the taxpayers' burden of proving that it was not being 
used "principally as a device" . . . . 
137 Electrical Securities Corp. v. Comm 'r, 92 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1937). 
138 Bl'l'TKE& & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SIIAIIE· 
HOLDERS 16-38 {3d ed. 1971). 
1ao Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602, 613 (D. Mont. 1971). 
140 353 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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Accordingly, once the stock was distributed, if it could poto1tially be 
converted into cash withmd thereby impairing taxpayers' equity interest 
in RBS, the transaction could easily be used to avoid taxes. The 
business purpose here alleged, which could be fully satisfied by a bail-out 
of dividends, is not sufficient to prove that the transaction was not being 
principally so used. 
In the absence of any direct benefit to the business of the original com-
pany, and on a slwwing that the spin-off put saleable assets in the 
lumds of the taxpayers, the continued retention of 1vhich teas 11ot 11eeded 
to continue the business enterprise, or to accomplish taxpayers' purposes, 
... the distribution was principally a device to distribute earnings and 
profits.141 
Furthermore, the court stated that it preferred this application of 
the device test to reliance upon formulations such as business 
purpose or active business, citing Whitman, who in this context 
was quite critical of the appellate opinion in Wilson, pointing 
out it downgraded the device concept to a mere formality.142 
Thus, it may be concluded that under the Rafferty approach, 
business purpose is merely an element that the ta.'\."Payer must 
prove if the transaction offers bail-out potentiality, but has no 
independent significance beyond this limited role. 
Consequently, where the taxpayer shows that the transaction 
displays no real potential for a bail-out and the reformulated 
active business test is met, he should prevail even in the absence 
of a business purpose, Wilson notwithstanding, since he has satis-
fied his burden that it was not being used "principally as a 
device." This approach corresponds nicely to an analysis of the 
reference to earnings and profits as suggesting a dividend equival-
ence focus and the use of device as implying a tax avoidance con-
cept (which invokes a business purpose defense). It may be 
significant that the assets (conditional sales contracts) of the 
spun-off corporation in Wilson were highly liquid and that a sale 
of its stock would not appear to adversely affect the shareholders 
of the ongoing retail furniture company, so that the result reached 
would not vary under the Rafferty device test, only the reasoning. 
Indeed, the central weakness of the Wilson approach is high-
141 Rafferty v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770-71 (1st Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). 
142 Rafferty's bail-out potentiality approach is better suited to policing spin·offs 
of active businesses than an independent business purpose test. Thus, the apprehension 
by some commentators that without the Wilson rule a bail-out of e!lrnings could be 
accomplished by a three or five year ''holding period'' should be allayed. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
494 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27: 
lighted by the recent Hanson decision.l43 There, the court found 
adequate business purposes for the separation of a financing busi-
ness that also satisfied the active business requirement. The Com-
missioner having conceded that the transaction was not a device, 
the taxpayer prevailed. 
DEviCE AND BusiNEss PuRPOSE REGULATIONS 
AFTER Rafferty 
An evaluation of the section 355 device and busness purpose 
regulations in light of Rafferty does not reveal the broad sweep 
repudiation evident in the active business regulations. Rather the 
primary impression is one of a reordering of priorities in the 
weight and role of their elements. An exception may be found in 
the postdistribution sales provisions of the device regulations 144 
which, though previously the most critical aspect of these regula-
tions, appear for the most part no longer relevant and certainly 
not conclusive or even presumptive. Although not directly criti-
cized in the opinion, they are not consonant with the rationale 
supporting the bail-out potential approach. If a sale of one of the 
postdistribution corporations impairs the taxpayer's equity in 
the other corporation, the sale has not likely been used as a bail-
out; on the other hand, if a sale would not impair such equity 
and the assets are readily salable, "the substance of the trans-
action is such as to leave the taxpayer in a position to distribute 
the earnings and profits of the corporation away from, or out of 
the business" 145 regardless of whether a sale actually occurs. 
Possibly, postdistribution sales could be a factor in the infre-
quent situations in which the assets do not have a readily realiz-
able value but their actual sale, nevertheless, does not impair the 
taxpayer's interest in the ongoing corporation or the potential 
for bail-out is real but shareholder motives germane to the con-
tinuance of the corporate business are shown. In both cases, the 
bail-out which appeared highly unlikely (only b<'cause a sale 
appeared unlikely) has, in fact, occurred through a postdistribu-
tion sale. 
The focus of these regulations on the proportion of active busi-
ness or liquid assets 146 is both amplified and narrowed by Rafferty. 
Whether the stock of one of the postdistribution corporations can 
143 Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971), 
144 Reg. §§ 1.355-2(b) (1) and (2). 
Hs 452 F.2d at 771. 
146 Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2). 
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be potentially or readily converted into cash has now become a 
critical question. It is not determinative, however, since tht> poten-
tial for a bail-out is not real unless such sale would also not 
impair the taxpayer's equity interest in the other corporation. 
This limitation, which is nowhere contained in the existing device 
regulations, is a definite restriction on them. 
Business purpose and continuity of interest 147 still play a role 
since shareholder business purpose and continuity of interest, 
in the limited sense of continuity of the business enterprise, are 
in effect melded into a single requirement that retention of the 
spun-off assets must be needed to accomplish the shareholder's 
purpose (if the spin-off puts salable assets in the hands of 
shareholders and their continued retention is not needed to con-
tinue the business enterprise-continuity of interest again). 
Similarly, the need to show a corporate benefit or business pur-
pose where shareholders motives will not meet the above test is 
triggered by bail-out potential. In summary, the theory of 
Rafferty~ though not the express language, indicates that business 
purpose and the modified continuity of interest requirement do 
not exist independently of the device test as the regulations imply 
and the Service asserts. 
Conclusion 
The First Circuit's election in Rafferty to rely primarily on the 
device clause to police bail-outs offers a new approach to section 
355, one long demanded by commentators. Whether that approach, 
which was accompanied by a deliberate abrogation of most of 
the elements of the already shaky active business regulations, will 
mature and introduce predictability to this area will turn on two 
imponderables: (1) the course taken by the "modification" of the 
regulations that the Treasury has been considering for eight years, 
and (2) the degree to which the new formulations of device, 
active business and business purpose, as well as the radiations 
of the Rafferty reasoning (and dicta) are perceived and followed 
by subsequent decisions. 
The viability of the present active business regulations is no 
longer debatable; if the Service attempts to resuscitate them as 
the principal barrier to bail-outs, further taxpayer challenges to 
their validity can only result. Viewed solely from the vanta~e point 
of section 355, Rafferty presents a blueprint for regulations that 
147Reg. § 1.355-2(c). 
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would maintain a more precise and reliable screen against poten-
tial bail-outs but permit other transactions to pass unscathed. If 
the court's bail-out potentiality approach-(1) where salable 
assets are placed in the hands of shareholders with interests in 
both postdistribution corporations, and (2) their retention is not 
needed to continue the business of the other corporation, then 
(and only then) (3) the taxpayer must show that either their 
retention is necessary to accomplish his business purpose, or 
( 4) that the distribution serves a corporate purpose equal to or 
greater than the bail-out opportunity-is substituted for the 
present device and business purpose regulations, the active busi-
ness reg-ulations could be safely reduced to a quantitative and 
qualitative corporate activities test that distinguishes corporate 
operations from mere investments. Thus, whatever apprehension 
the Service may have had that liberalizing the active business 
regulations would open the floodgates for a deluge of bail-outs 
should be alleviated by adoption of the Rafferty tack in the device 
regulations along with the revision of the active business regula-
tions. Furthermore, although the purposes of the active business 
rule and device requirement have always overlapped/48 this step 
would restore the active business rule to supplementing, not sup-
planting, the device clause. 
The partial liquidation provisions of section 346 and the active 
business regulations issued thereunder, which expressly incor-
porate the active business definition of section 1.355-2 (c) of the 
regulations, contain no counterpart to the device clause of section 
355. Thus, this too may be a factor in the Treasury's gestation 
period for modifications of the section 355 regulations. It should 
be noted, however, that the chief, though not the sole, conceptual 
weakness in the present regulations is that they are bottomed on 
the rejected separate business requirement. Y ett under section 
346, that requirement is dictated by the clear language of the 
statute and, indeed, the section 346 requirement may have been 
the inspiration for the two business restrictions contained in the 
section 355 regulations.140 Thus, portions of these regulations may 
be salvaged for application to section 346 only. In any event if that 
148 E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 696, n.7 (1971). 
149 Some legislative history also suggested this construction, and with tho promises: 
(1) the reduction in scope that would occur in the division of a single business in l1nlvos 
prevented each from qualifying as the same "such trade or business" as hn<l existed 
before the distribution and (2) that "such trade or business" in section 355(b)(2) (B) 
referred to the same predistribution active business required by section 355(b) (1), tho 
statute itself supported the two business requirement. See Reg. § 1.355-1 (d) Ex. 11. 
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alternative is not chosen, section 346 would not be the only active 
business provision unaccompanied by explanatory or definitional 
regulations.150 The ultimate resolution of this problem lies per-
haps in a congressional exploration of whether a modification of 
the Rafferty device is a suitable substitute under section 346 for 
the present active business safe harbor. 
Case law development will probably follow Rafferty with 
respect to its reformulation of device-King is a current example. 
A possible exception may arise as to the role of business purpose 
since the Ninth Circuit has held that it must be shown regardless 
of whether the device clause is satisfied, and the First Circuit did 
not expressly hold on this question. Rather the latter's ju.·daposi-
tion of bail-out potentiality and business purpose as well as its 
preference of device over active business and business purpose to 
police bail-outs only suggests that it would disagree with Wilson. 
In any event, if the Rafferty position on device is followed, it is 
to be hoped that its deemphasis of active business will also be 
followed. For the two are but the faces of a single coin-the 
transactional approach. 
As to the First Circuit's view of the active business require-
ment, King also evidences that the express pronouncements (even 
where dicta) on functional divisions, independent production of 
income and corporations dealing only with related entities will 
prevail. Whether other courts will limit the active business test 
to a requirement of objective indicia of entrepreneurial activities 
quantitatively and qualitatively, distinguishing corporate opera-
tions from mere investments, is a harder question. In addition, the 
effect the radiations of Rafferty will have in the Ta.'"{ Court 
on the continuing precedent value of such Tax Court decisions as 
the Elliot trilogy and the more recent cases of Spheeris and King 
is not possible to predict at this point. Hopefully, however, theTa.'"{ 
Court will give serious reconsideration to its previous stance on 
the section 355 active business clause now that a reinterpretation 
of the device clause is available and the existing active business 
regulations have been seriously, even fatally, questioned by two 
circuit opinions. While under the facts of many of these deci-
sions the results would not vary under the new approach, this 
would not be the case in non pro rata divisions or pro rata 
separations in which the salable real estate was so distinctive 
that its sale would impair the ongoing corporation's operations. 
Rafferty has signaled a new beginning under section 355; hope-
lso See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 274, 921(2), 931(n)(2), 1551, nnd 1372(e)(5)(B)(i). 
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fully it will be followed uniformly and administratively without 
an ensuing decade of taxpayer uncertainty and perplexed com-
mentary, as has been the situation after Coady. But if that mil-
lenium does not arrive, the bail-out potentiality concept can also 
serve as a blueprint for Congress to ''enable the business com-
munity to adjust more freely its methods of conducting business'' 
and at the same time to effectively isolate an attempted bail-out 
of earnings and profits from a valid corporate readjustment.1G1 
151 Note, Section 355 's Active Business Rule-An Outdated Inefficacy, 24 VAND. L. 
'REV. 955, 956 (1971). 
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